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Preface
This thesis is about two major economic topics, trade policy and education choice.
The first and the second essay analyze trade policy with special attention to tariff
formation in intermediate-good sectors. The first essay explains tariff formation in
intermediate-good sectors from a national perspective. I build a political economy
model in which lobby groups try to influence the government, which is both con-
cerned about social welfare and collecting contributions from the lobby groups. It
turns out that in such a model the equilibrium tariffs on intermediate goods deviate
systematically from the tariffs on final goods. The second essay analyzes the tariff
formation in intermediate-good sectors from an international perspective. It shows
in a strategic trade policy model that the consideration of intermediate goods has a
strong effect on the government’s optimal policy towards final goods also. The third
essay is about education choice. I introduce social preferences into a simple model
of education choice. Social preferences mean that individuals are not only concerned
about their material self-interest, but also about their relative income in comparison
to others. It is shown that the individuals with social preferences take a systematically
different education choice than purely self-interested individuals. The results can
explain empirical evidence concerning the educational success of students.
In the remainder of this preface, I will introduce the two topics in more detail
and explain what my research contributes to the existing literature.
Trade policy
The most prominent theories to explain the existence of tariffs and subsidies are
the theory of the political economy of trade policy and the theory of strategic trade
policy. The former assumes that governments are not only concerned about the
national welfare, but also follow own interests. These interests can be reelection
motives or the collection of contributions. In the seminal paper in this field, written by
Preface 2
Grossman and Helpman (1994), lobby groups try to influence the government’s trade
policy in their favor by offering contributions conditioned on trade policy. The theory
of strategic trade policy explains policy interventions (often subsidies) by imperfect
competition as trade policy can then improve the strategic position of domestic in
comparison to foreign firms. A strategic relationship between domestic and foreign
firms is given if they compete in their own or third markets and thereby influence each
others’ profits. Seminal papers in this field are Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton
and Grossman (1986). In both the political economy of trade policy and the strategic
trade policy there exists an extensive literature on their functioning for final goods.
The model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) has been extended to a two-country
framework (Grossman and Helpman 1995), to endogenous lobby formation (Mitra
1999), to other policy instruments than tariffs like quotas and VERs (Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare 2000), by the consideration of labor interests (Rama and Tabellini
1998 and Matschke 2004), and to monopolistic competition (Chang 2005). Among
other things, the literature on strategic trade policy covers the following areas: The
role R&D can play in strategic trade policy (Spencer and Brander 1983 and Bagwell
and Staiger 1994), the importance of timing for the outcome of strategic trade policy
(Carmichael 1987 and Gruenspecht 1988), how a repeated-game structure changes
strategic trade policy (Davidson 1984 and Rotemberg and Saloner 1989), the impact
of asymmetric information between the firms and the government (Qiu 1994), and how
entry and exit of firms influences strategic trade policy (Dixit and Kyle 1985, Venables
1985, and Bagwell and Staiger 1992). While all these approaches analyze final goods,
there is a growing literature in both fields that seeks to answer whether the results
found for final goods also apply to intermediate goods. In the following, I describe
more precisely how my first two essays contribute to the literature on intermediate
goods.
Tariff Formation in Upstream Industries with Labor Interests. As already
mentioned, the literature on the political economy of trade policy has mainly focused
on explaining tariffs on final goods. There are two recent approaches by Gawande
and Krishna (2005) and by Lopez and Matschke (2006) that consider intermediate
goods, but they do so in a different way and with a different focus than I do. In
my essay, I extend the seminal model of tariff formation in final goods, by Grossman
and Helpman (1994), by adding intermediate goods and labor interests. Thereby, I
can give an explanation for the empirical observation (see, e.g., Baack and Ray 1983,
Marvel and Ray 1983, and Ray 1991) of higher tariffs on final goods compared to
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intermediate goods. The reason that tariffs on intermediate goods deviate from tariffs
on final goods is that different conflicts of interests exist for both kinds of goods in
my model. In the case of final goods, owners of factors of production seek positive
tariffs on their goods as they increase their profits, while consumers suffer from tariffs
as consumption gets more expensive. If factor owners are organized in lobbies, in
equilibrium there will almost always be (as long as not all individuals are organized
in lobby groups) a positive tariff on their good. In the case of intermediate goods, the
owners of the factors of intermediate-good production lobby in favor of a tariff. But,
factor owners in final-good sectors that need the intermediate good for their produc-
tion lobby against tariffs as they increase their input prices. Therefore, it depends on
industry characteristics whether there is a positive tariff on an intermediate good in
case of sectoral lobbying. Labor interests are created in my model by the introduction
of unions and endogenous unemployment benefits. Research by Rama and Tabellini
(1998) shows that labor market distortions increase tariffs in final-good sectors. My
essay demonstrates that this result does not hold for intermediate-good sectors. Hence,
it is not feasible in general to resolve labor market distortions by reducing tariffs as
Rama and Tabellini suggest.
The Risk of Vertical Specialization for Strategic Trade Policy. The lit-
erature on intermediate goods in the field of strategic trade policy is already further
developed than the literature in the field of the political economy of trade policy. I only
want to discuss two approaches here, which are most closely related to my own work.
Bernhofen (1997) introduces a vertical stucture into the model of Brander and Spencer
(1985). In his approach, a foreign monopolist supplies inputs that both final-good
producing firms need for their production. Thereby, the incentive to subsidize final-
good production is reduced as a subsidy not only shifts profits horizontally, but also
vertically. If the intermediate-good supplier can price discriminate between the final-
good producers, the optimal policy even changes to a tax on final-good production.
Ishikawa and Spencer (1999) analyze the role of intermediate goods in a model where
an intermediate and a final good are produced in two countries. With the assumption
of Cournot competition, an export subsidy aimed at shifting rents from foreign to do-
mestic final-good producers may also shift rents to foreign intermediate-good suppliers.
Thus, as long as a subsidy increases the price of the intermediate good, the desirability
of a subsidy is smaller the more intermediate-good producers are foreign. These two
approaches (and the literature on intermediate goods and strategic trade policy in
general) have in common that the industry distribution over countries is symmetric.
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But, there is a trend in industrialized countries to concentrate on the production of
final goods and to outsource the production of intermediate goods. Hence, my second
essay is about a case where industry distribution over countries is asymmetric: In
a successive international Cournot duopoly, I analyze the different strategic options
countries with and without domestic intermediate-good production have. Domestic
intermediate-good production may give a country a strategic advantage as it can
subsidize its final-good production more aggressively. I build a framework in which
three countries are engaged in trade policy. One with intermediate- and final-good
production, one only with intermediate-good production and one only with final-good
production. I show that the country with both industries typically dominates the
other countries’ policy. It subsidizes its production more aggressively both in the
intermediate- and in the final-good sector. Additionally, there are interesting inter-
actions between the non-specialized country’s policy towards its intermediate- and
final-good production. One surprising result is for example that the subsidization
of final-good production can be decreasing with the relative efficiency of domestic
production. This can be the case if the non-specialized country’s intermediate-good
producer captures a large share of the profits shifted vertically.
Education Choice
A student’s academic success can be explained in a variety of ways. Often it is
seen as a result of the exogenous influences a student is exposed to in and outside
school. As the main influences on educational outcome at school, broad branches
of the literature on education discuss class-size effects (see, e.g., Angrist and Lavy
1999, Case and Deaton 1999, Krueger 1999, and Wo¨ßmann and West 2006), the
teacher quality (see, e.g., Hanushek 1986, Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald 1994, and
Angrist and Lavy 2001) and the effects of grouping students by ability (see, e.g.,
Figlio and Page 2002, Meghir and Palme 2005, and Hanushek and Wo¨ßmann 2006).
The latter are often explained by peer group effects, how the influence is labeled that
classmates have on a student’s educational achievement. These are empirically well
established (see, e.g., Hoxby 2000, Sacerdote 2001, and Robertson and Symons 2003)
and explained as spillover effects or as a result of bad students’ tendency to disrupt
class (Lazear 2001). Outside school, the family background is empirically established
as the main influence on a student’s academic success (see, e.g., Solon 1992, Mulligan
1997, and Fuchs and Wo¨ßmann 2006). There are many explanations why a good
family background can improve a child’s education opportunities (see Piketty 2000 for
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an excellent overview). Often used are the family transmission of ability, imperfect
capital markets, local segregation or self-fulfilling beliefs. All those theories have in
common that they neglect the importance of a student’s own motivation for his or
her educational achievement. What do the best exogenous educational opportunities
help, if a student does not learn at home, does not concentrate at school, i.e. does not
spend effort in education? It is certainly true that a student who is only interested in
his material self-interest will spend more effort in education the better the exogenous
opportunities are as they increase his return to education. But, recent research on
individuals’ preferences indicates that individuals are not only interested in their
material self-interest, but also in their relative income in comparison to others. In
my third essay, I integrate those so called ’social preferences’ in a simple model of
educational choice and analyze how they change individuals’ education choices.
Education Choice with Social Preferences. The importance of family back-
ground and social environment for individuals’ academic attainment is, as mentioned
above, empirically well established. Surprisingly, there is only little theoretical re-
search linking individuals’ education choice with these external influences (see Akerlof
and Kranton 2002 and Bishop 2006 for alternative approaches). Therefore, I build a
simple education choice model where individuals do not only care about their material
self-interest, but also about their relative income in comparison to others. Recent
experimental studies (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Fehr and Gaechter 2000, and Henrich et
al. 2001) underline the importance of such social preferences in individuals’ economic
decisions. I show that with social preferences individuals’ time investment in education
is no longer increasing with ability and individuals with relatively rich parents invest
systematically more time in education than individuals with relatively poor parents.
By the latter result, my model offers a new explanation for the persistence of inter-
generational income inequality. Additionally it is shown, that with the assumption
of a high correlation between parental and peers’ income, effort spend in education
increases with the peers’ income.
Chapter 1
Tariff Formation in Upstream
Industries with Labor Interests
1.1 Introduction
The explanation of tariff variation across industries has evoked a lot of research ac-
tivity at least since the early nineties. The seminal approach of Grossman and Help-
man (1994) explains different tariffs across industries by introducing lobbying into the
analysis. Following Grossman and Helpman, a branch of political economy literature
extended1 and tested2 their model in a variety of settings. Interestingly, all these pa-
pers focus on the tariff formation in final-good sectors rather than intermediate-good
sectors. But trade with intermediate goods covers around half of developed countries’
trade and several empirical studies (see, e.g., Baack and Ray 1983, Marvel and Ray
1983, and Ray 1991) show systematic differences between the protection of final-good
and intermediate-good sectors. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to analyze the tariff
formation in intermediate-good sectors.3 The main questions that arise are: Where do
the differences in protection between final and intermediate-good sectors come from?
Do the determinants in tariff formation effect tariffs on intermediate goods in the same
way as tariffs on final goods? Which new effects have to be considered for tariff forma-
1See, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1995), Rama and Tabellini (1998), Mitra (1999), Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare (2000), Matschke (2004), and Chang (2005).
2See, e.g., Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Eicher and Osang
(2002), Mitra et al. (2002, 2006), McCalman (2004), Esfahani (2005), and Matschke and Sherlund
(2006).
3Two recent papers, by Gawande and Krishna (2005) and by Lopez and Matschke (2006), also
integrate intermediate goods in the framework of Grossman and Helpman. But, they do so in a
different way and with a different focus of interest.
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tion in intermediate-good sectors? To answer these questions, my approach does not
restrict interest to final goods, but additionally integrates intermediate goods in the
framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994). It is shown that differences in protection
are mainly driven by the different conflicts of interests that occur in intermediate-good
sectors in comparison to final-good sectors. Protection of intermediate-good sectors
hurts final-good producers and thus induces them to engage against it. Hence, there is
a conflict between two groups of producers, while in final-good sectors producers’ inter-
ests are in conflict with consumers’ interests alone. Lobbying against a large group of
consumers, that is only slightly affected by a tariff, leads to other results than lobbying
against a small group of producers, that is affected substantially by a tariff.
A second direction in which my model extends Grossman and Helpman deals with
labor market distortions. While the role of specific capital interests in tariff forma-
tion has often been emphasized, there is only little research which integrates labor
market interests (see Rama and Tabellini 1998 and Matschke 2004). This is surpris-
ing as empirics show that labor issues matter in tariff formation (see, e.g., Andersen
1980, Marvel and Ray 1983, and Ray 1991). In the original Grossman and Helpman
framework, labor is assumed to be mobile across sectors. Thereby, only sector-specific
capital benefits from protection and organizes itself in lobby groups to increase its
sectoral tariff. However, besides capital owners, employees also benefit from trade
protection. Both sectoral employment and wages increase if tariffs rise.4 Thus, labor
unions have an incentive to influence trade policies, too. While capital owners and
labor unions agree upon the desired direction of trade policy, they disagree concerning
labor market policies. Employees want to be protected by the government via unem-
ployment benefits, while capital owners oppose them. An empirical paper by Matschke
and Sherlund (2006) confirms the explanatory power of labor market interests within
a modified Grossman and Helpman framework. The reason to integrate labor market
distortions into my model are the different effects they have on tariffs on intermediate
goods in comparison to final goods.
Rama and Tabellini (1998) were the first to deal with labor interests in a Grossman
and Helpman setting. In their model capital owners and union members lobby the
government on both tariffs and minimum wages. Their main result is that trade barriers
and labor market distortions move in the same direction. They draw the conclusion
that foreign organizations can resolve a country’s labor market distortions by reducing
its tariffs rather than target labor markets directly. With my approach, I show that
4At least with the small country assumption.
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such a policy can fail, since it may not work for intermediate-good sectors.
To integrate labor market rigidities into my model, I use a simplified version of the
framework developed by Matschke (2004). Her approach is more general in comparison
to Rama and Tabellini and is closer to the original Grossman and Helpman setting.
Matschke’s results confirm the findings of Rama and Tabellini. In her model (exoge-
nous) unemployment benefits increase tariffs. But, it is critical for the results of both,
Rama and Tabellini (1998) and Matschke (2004), that they examine final-good sectors.
As already mentioned, I can show that their results do not carry through to the case
of intermediate goods. Unemployment benefits and tariffs are positively correlated if
tariffs decrease sectoral unemployment and thereby social costs of unemployment. This
is always the case in final-good sectors, in which tariffs increase production and em-
ployment at the cost of consumers. But in intermediate-good sectors, it is ambiguous
whether an increase in tariffs reduces sectoral unemployment or not. On the one hand,
higher tariffs increase employment in the intermediate-good sector, but on the other
hand, they decrease employment in dependent final-good sectors. Thus, it depends
upon industry characteristics whether it is possible to resolve labor market distortions
via trade policy as Rama and Tabellini suggest.
Across intermediate-good sectors, the main source of tariff variation is the relative
size of dependent final-good sectors in comparison to intermediate-good sectors. This
relative size influences the tariff in two ways. On the one hand, the size of a sector
determines the strength of its lobbying. Thus, large final-good industries can prevent
tariffs on their inputs. The same argument holds for the need of inputs in final-good
production. The higher this need, the stronger is the opposition of final-good producers
against tariffs on their inputs and thereby the smaller are the tariffs. On the other hand,
the larger a final-good sector and the higher its dependence on an intermediate good,
the more devastating is the impact of an intermediate-good tariff on the economy-
wide unemployment. Thereby, the social costs of tariffs in those sectors are higher.
Therefore, the government which cares not only about collecting contributions, but also
about social welfare sets smaller tariffs. A third determinant of tariffs in intermediate-
good sectors are tariff revenues. The lobbies in all sectors in which production is
independent of a certain intermediate good prefer import tariffs on that good, if it is
an import good, and export tariffs otherwise.
An additional insight the model provides is the interaction of tariffs in connected
intermediate- and final-good sectors. Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) already
examined both theoretically and empirically how exogenous tariffs on intermediate
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goods influence tariffs on final goods. Empirics support their theoretical prediction that
tariffs on final goods are positively correlated with tariffs on intermediate goods used
in the final-good production. My model supports this result and shows additionally
that the same is true in the other direction. Tariffs on a final good increase the tariffs
on the connected intermediate goods.
In summary, my model is the first that provides a theoretical explanation for the
variance of tariffs on intermediate goods in a political economy framework. The model
detects the sources of different tariff levels in final- and intermediate-good sectors.
Consideration of labor interest gives new insights into the interactions between trade
and labor market policies. The results concerning tariffs on intermediate goods contra-
dict results that have been derived for final goods and give more differentiated policy
advices for trade and labor market policies.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model
framework. The equilibrium policy is described and interpreted in Section 1.3. Sec-
tion 1.4 concludes. The Appendix contains some derivations that are needed for the
calculation of the equilibrium policy.
1.2 The Model
The model describes an economy that consists of n + 1 sectors. Every non-numeraire
sector5 is divided into one intermediate and one final-good subsector. Within each
sector, intermediate goods are needed for production of final goods. This means that a
final-good producer can not substitute the intermediate good produced in his sector by
an intermediate good from another sector (but may import the intermediate good from
abroad). On the other hand, intermediate-good producers can only serve the final-good
producers in their sector or export their good. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994),
there is an exogenous world market price p∗i of final goods in sector i. Assuming a
small country, national prices are determined by pi = p
∗
i + t
F
i , where t
F
i is the tariff on
the final good in sector i chosen by the government. For the intermediate goods, there
is a separated world market price q∗i and a separated national price qi = q
∗
i + t
I
i . The
tariff on the intermediate good in sector i tIi is chosen by the government separately
from the tariffs on final goods. For an importing subsector tji > 0 (t
j
i < 0) is equivalent
to an import tariff (import subsidy). In an exporting subsector tji > 0 (t
j
i < 0)
5The n+1th sector is a numeraire sector, which simplifies the modeling of consumption. If not
explicitly mentioned, we will only talk about nonnumeraire sectors in what follows.
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describes an export subsidy (export tax). It is assumed that one unit of the final
good is produced with a fixed share βi of the intermediate good. Thus, final-good
producers suffer from tariffs on intermediate goods in their sector. All subsectors
are provided with sector-specific capital Kji and labor L
j
i , where the index j = F, I
stands for final-good or intermediate-good subsectors. Production F ij(Kji , α
j
iL
j
i ) uses
sectoral capital and labor and its functions F ij are weakly concave with positive cross-
derivatives. αji denotes the share of employment per subsector. The described setting
gives both capital owners and workers an incentive to organize in lobbies to influence
trade policy. As producers, both capital lobbies and trade unions lobby for protection
of their own sector, while as consumers, they lobby against protection of final goods in
other sectors. Final-good producers lobby additionally against tariffs on intermediate
goods in their sector, as these tariffs increase their input prices. Besides trade policy,
the government can use unemployment benefits u as an additional policy instrument.
With its labor market policy, the government is able to redistribute from capital to
labor. Therefore, trade unions lobby for high unemployment benefits, while capital
lobbies oppose them. The government could be induced to use this socially harmful
instrument, if trade unions have a higher influence on policy than capital lobbies. All
in all, the government controls three redistributive policy instruments. With tariffs
on final goods, the government can protect final-good producers at the expense of
consumers. Tariffs on intermediate goods support intermediate-good producers and
hurt final-good producers. Finally, the national-wide even unemployment benefits help
all workers and harm all capital owners.
The model has to formalize two interlinked decision problems. On the one hand,
capital owners and trade unions have to agree upon wages and employment in all
subsectors; on the other hand, the government needs to decide upon its policy, while
all lobbies try to influence the government’s decision. Following Matschke (2004),
it seems to be reasonable to assume that bargaining about employment and wages
takes place more often than reconsiderations of trade and labor market policy. That
is, capital lobbies and unions take tariffs and unemployment benefits as given for
their employment bargaining. This assumption gives the model a two-stage structure.
In the first stage, tariffs and unemployment benefits are realized in a menu auction
between all lobbies and the government. In the second stage, wages and employment
are determined by Nash bargaining between capitalists and workers with given tariffs
and unemployment benefits. This game has to be solved by backward induction. The
next section will describe the outcome of the wage bargaining in stage two, while
afterwards the policy game in stage one will be solved.
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1.2.1 Wage Bargaining
In every subsector, the wage wji and the share of employment α
j
i are determined by Nash
bargaining between capital owners and workers. In this cooperative setting, the share of
employment will be efficient for a given unemployment benefit. Both capital and labor
need not necessarily be organized in lobbies in every sector. I assume that all employees
in a sector are covered by wage bargaining. This is a simplification in comparison to
Matschke (2004), who divides sectors in unionized and non-unionized subsectors and
integrates anti-discrimination quotas that force firms in the unionized sector to employ
non-unionized workers and vice versa. This more specific setting would provide no
additional insights for my comparison of the different influences of labor interests on
the tariffs on intermediate and final goods. In my setting, the bargaining position of
workers gets stronger the higher the unemployment benefits are. The reason is that
being unemployed is the outside option for workers in wage and employment bargaining.
Therefore, the government, by increasing the unemployment benefits, redistributes
not only to the unemployed but also to employees. For unorganized capital owners
or workers the Nash bargaining solution can be interpreted as an average wage in a
subsector. The properties of the Nash Bargaining solution which drive the results of
the model make sense for non-collective wage bargaining, too. Namely that wages
increase with unemployment benefits and with the bargaining power of workers and
that employment decreases with unemployment benefits. The next two sections provide
a formal description of the Nash bargaining solution for intermediate-good and final-
good sectors.
Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Intermediate-Good Sectors
The payments a subsector’s labor force receives are the wages paid to the employed
and the unemployment benefits
αIiL
I
iw
I
i + (1− αIi )LIiu. (1.1)
As only labor imposes costs on firms, the profits of capital owners in sector i are equal
to
qiF
iI(KIi , α
I
iL
I
i )− αIiLIiwIi . (1.2)
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With fixed tariffs and unemployment benefits the generalized Nash bargaining solution6
between capital owners and workers solves
max
αIi ,w
I
i
((qiF
iI(KIi , α
I
iL
I
i )− αIiLIiwIi )1−s
I
i (αIiL
I
i (w
I
i − u))s
I
i ) (1.3)
where sIi is the exogenously given relative bargaining power of workers in intermediate-
good production in sector i.
Using the FOCs of the maximization problem, the share of employment αIi is im-
plicitly given by
qiF
iI
L (K
I
i , α
I
iL
I
i ) = u (1.4)
and wages can be expressed as
wIi = (1− sIi )u+ sIi
qiF
iI
αIiL
I
i
. (1.5)
As one can see, the wages are a weighted sum of the unemployment benefits and the
average value product of labor. The higher the bargaining power of workers, the higher
is their income, as they can extract a larger part of the firms’ profits in wage bargaining.
For the determination of the equilibrium tariffs and unemployment benefits in the
policy game in stage one of the model, the effects of changes of all policy instruments
on the welfare of capital owners and workers have to be calculated. For this purpose
the following derivatives are needed:
∂αIi
∂qi
= − u
q2i F
iI
LLL
I
i
> 0, (1.6)
∂(αIiw
I
i )
∂qi
=
sIiF
iI
LIi
+
∂αIi
∂qi
u > 0, (1.7)
∂αIi
∂u
=
1
qiF iILLL
I
i
< 0. (1.8)
Obviously, the only policy instruments which affect the specific factor returns in any
intermediate-good subsector are the tariffs in this subsector and the unemployment
6For a discussion of wage bargaining concepts see McDonald and Solow (1981).
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benefits. In the next section we will see that the situation is different in final-good
subsectors.
Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Final-Good Sectors
The earnings of the labor force in a final-good subsector can be expressed in the same
way as in intermediate-good subsectors:
αFi L
F
i w
F
i + (1− αFi )LFi u. (1.9)
But, the expression for the firms’ profits in a final-good subsectors shows the main
difference between final and intermediate-good sectors:
(pi − βiqi)F iF (KFi , αFi LFi )− αFi LFi wFi . (1.10)
As the share βi of intermediate good i is needed for the production of one unit of
final good i, the price of that intermediate good influences profits in the final-good
subsector. Hence, the Nash bargaining solution for wage and employment bargaining
solves the following maximization problem:
max
αFi ,w
F
i
(((pi − βiqi)F iF (KFi , αFi LFi )− αFi LFi wFi )1−s
F
i (αFi L
F
i (w
F
i − u))s
F
i ) (1.11)
where sFi is the exogenously given relative bargaining power of workers in final-good
production in sector i.
Using the FOC, employment can still be determined by
(pi − βiqi)F iFL (KFi , αFi LFi ) = u (1.12)
and wages can be expressed as
wFi = (1− sFi )u+ sFi
(pi − βiqi)F iF
αFi L
F
i
. (1.13)
But, specific factor returns are now not only dependent on tariffs in the final-good
subsector, but also on tariffs in the connected intermediate-good subsector. Thereby,
specific factor owners in the final-good subsector get interested in tariffs on interme-
diate goods. They will try to influence the tariffs on the intermediate good in their
sector in the policy game. Thus, for calculations of the equilibrium tariffs, two addi-
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tional derivatives are needed in comparison to intermediate-good subsectors. Those
derivatives determine how returns to specific factors in the final-good sectors change,
if tariffs on intermediate goods change:
∂αFi
∂pi
= − u
(pi − βiqi)2F iFLLLFi
> 0, (1.14)
∂(αFi w
F
i )
∂pi
=
sFi F
iF
LFi
+
∂αFi
∂pi
u > 0, (1.15)
∂αFi
∂u
=
1
(pi − βiqi)F iFLLLFi
< 0, (1.16)
∂αFi
∂qi
=
βiu
(pi − βiqi)2F iFLLLFi
< 0, (1.17)
∂(αFi w
F
i )
∂qi
= −s
F
i βiF
iF
LFi
+
∂αFi
∂qi
u < 0. (1.18)
As − sFi βiF iF
LFi
is strictly negative and with consideration of (1.9), workers in final-good
industries suffer from tariffs on intermediate goods used in the final-good production.
The other derivatives have the same and expected signs as in the case of final-good
sectors.
1.2.2 Lobby Groups and Social Welfare
The economy consists of N individuals. Each individual is either endowed with one
unit of sector-specific capital or with one unit of sector-specific labor. Individuals’
welfare is determined by the returns to their specific factor, their consumer surplus
s(p) and the per capita net revenues from taxes and subsidies r(p, q, u). The first part
of individuals’ welfare is their consumer surplus s(p). As in Grossman and Helpman
(1994), individuals have quasilinear consumption preferences. It is assumed that all
goods are consumed by the representative consumer. Then, the existence of a numeraire
good ensures that the consumption of every final good only depends on its own price
or rather tariff. Thus, the tariffs on final goods determine the consumer surplus s(p)
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and consumption levels d(p) and the impact of a tariff change on the consumer surplus
can easily be calculated.
The government finances unemployment benefits and trade subsidies by lump sum
taxes on a per capita basis, while the revenues from import taxation are redistributed
to the individuals. Thereby, the per capita net revenue from taxes and subsidies can
be expressed as
r(p, q, u) =
1
N
n∑
i=1
[(pi − p∗i )[Ndi − F iF ] + (qi − q∗i )[βiF iF − F iI ]
−LFi (1− αFi )u− LIi (1− αIi )u], (1.19)
where di is the per capita demand for the final good i.
The consumer surplus and the per capita net revenues from taxes and subsidies are
the same for all individuals. What makes individuals different is the return to their
specific factor. This return is influenced by tariffs and unemployment benefits as we
saw in the last sections. As already mentioned (this will be formalized below) the
government policy decision responds to lobby contributions. As the interests of owners
of different factors concerning policy are divergent, individuals which own the same
factor have an incentive to organize in lobbies. In the whole economy, there are two
subsectors per sector and in each subsector there are two specific factors. This means
that 4n groups of individuals with different interests exist in the economy. We assume
that L of them are organized in a lobby. A lobby represents the interest of all owners
of a specific factor. Hence, a lobby’s welfare is the aggregated welfare of all specific
factor owners. The returns to the specific factor labor are wages and unemployment
benefits. Thus, we can express a union’s welfare in a subsector with Lji workers as
WLji (p, q, u) = L
j
iα
j
iw
j
i + L
j
i (1− αji )u+ Lji [r(p, q, u) + s(p)], j = F, I, (1.20)
where wages wji and employment shares α
j
i are dependent on tariffs and unemployment
benefits.
The returns to capital are firms’ sales minus wages. The following equations already
reflect the outcome of the wage bargaining in stage two. Looking first at final-good
sectors, capital lobbies’ welfare is determined by
WKFi (p, q, u) = (1− sFi )[(pi − βiqi)F iF − αFi uLFi ] +KFi [r(p, q, u) + s(p)], (1.21)
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while capital lobbies’ welfare in intermediate-good sectors is
WKIi (p, q, u) = (1− sIi )[qiF iI − αIiuLIi ] +KIi [r(p, q, u) + s(p)]. (1.22)
Social welfare is the sum over all N individuals welfare. It can be expressed as
W (p, q, u) =
n∑
i=1
[(pi − βiqi)F iF + qiF iI + (1− αFi )uLFi + (1− αIi )uLIi ]
+N [r(p, q, u) + s(p)]. (1.23)
One might wonder why the unemployment benefits seem to influence the welfare in a
positive way. This is not the case as they have to be financed by taxes and therefore
their positive effect on labor income is fully outweighed by their negative effect on
Nr(p, q, u). Unemployment benefits’ net effect on welfare is the reduction of production
both in final and intermediate-good sectors.
Finally, it is necessary to characterize the objective function of the government.
As it is standard in this branch of literature, the government cares both about col-
lected political contributions Ci and social welfare W (p, q, u). It puts higher weight
on contributions than on (net-of-contributions) social welfare. Otherwise, it would be
impossible for lobbies to influence the government. An additional feature of my model
is, that the government weighs political contributions stronger, the more voters Si are
organized in a lobby. To model this government bias towards voters, I introduce a
function v(Si) with v
′(Si) > 0. The intuition behind this function is quite simple.
In a situation in which two lobbies offer the same amount of contributions pro and
contra a tariff,7 a government will be biased to serve the lobby that represents more
voters. This also reflects the informative effect of lobbying. Governments can learn
by lobbying what the needs of their voters are and the more voters Si signal to want
some policy c, the higher is the probability that this policy is adopted. However, this
bias to serve voters does not drive the main results of my model. But without it, the
existence of positive unemployment benefits could hardly be explained. The lobbies
offer contribution schedules C(p, q, u), which announce nonnegative payments to the
government for all possible policy choices. The government’s objective function is then
G(p, q, u) =
∑
i∈L
v(Si)Ci(p, q, u) + aW (p, q, u) a ≥ 0, (1.24)
7The effects on social welfare are are not considered here.
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where a is the government’s weight on (gross-of-contributions) social welfare. With the
government’s objective function the objective functions of all groups which participate
in the policy game have been characterized in a sufficient way. The next section
describes how these objective functions determine the outcome of the policy game.
The game is formalized as a menu auction, which is the standard way to solve such a
policy game in the Grossman and Helpman framework.
1.2.3 Equilibrium of the Lobby Game
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), the lobby game between the various lobbies and
the government has the structure of a menu-auction problem. In contrast to Grossman
and Helpman, the contribution functions do not only depend on the domestic price
vector of final goods p, but additionally on the domestic price vector of intermediate
goods q and the domestic unemployment benefits u. Let C be the set of possible policy
choices c which is defined as C := (P ×Q× U), where P ,Q and U are the sets from
which the government can choose p, q and u. Then, the equilibrium of the lobby game
can be characterized with regard to Lemma 2 of Bernheim and Whinston (1986):
Proposition 1.1: ({Coi }i∈L , co) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the lobby game if
and only if :
1. Coi is feasible for all i ∈ L;
2. co maximizes
∑
i∈L v(Si)C
o
i (c) + aW (c) on C
3. co maximizes Wj(c)− Coj (c) +
∑
i∈L v(Si)C
o
i (c) + aW (c) on C for every j ∈ L
4. for every j ∈ L there exists a cj ∈ C that maximizes ∑i∈L v(Si)Coi (c) + aW (c)
on C such that Coj (cj) = 0.
For a detailed discussion of this proposition the reader is referred to Grossman and
Helpman (1994). For my purposes it is enough to state that their results can be carried
over to the context of my model. To facilitate the analysis, differentiable contribution
functions are assumed. Then, similar to equation (12) in Grossman and Helpman, the
equilibrium domestic policy choice can be characterized by:∑
i∈L
v(Si)∇Wi(co) + a∇W (co) = 0. (1.25)
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To calculate the equilibrium policy choice, it must be examined how marginal policy
changes affect social and lobby groups’ welfare. In the setting of my model, we have to
analyze the effects of the three different policy instruments (tariffs on final goods, tariffs
on intermediate goods and unemployment benefits) on the welfare of four different kinds
of lobbies (capital lobbies and unions in final and intermediate-good sectors) and on
social welfare. Thereby, five derivatives are needed to calculate the equilibrium level of
each policy instrument. The interested reader can find the derivatives in the appendix
of this chapter.
After inserting the derivatives into the above equation, one can solve for the equilib-
rium tariffs on final goods, on intermediate goods and the equilibrium unemployment
benefits. The next section presents the equilibrium of the policy game, explains the
differences to previous results in the literature and discusses possible political implica-
tions.
1.3 Equilibrium Policy Structure
To analyze the equilibrium policy structure we start with tariffs on final goods.
These tariffs have already been analyzed by various authors. We will compare my
results to the results of the basic model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) and to
the results of approaches, which already integrated labor interests, namely Rama and
Tabellini (1998) and Matschke (2004). Furthermore, we check whether the effects
of (exogenous) intermediate goods on tariffs on final goods, detected by Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000), are preserved in my framework. Then, we will proceed
with the main contribution of my approach, the equilibrium tariffs on intermediate
goods, and compare their structure to the final-good case. Finally, we will analyse the
equilibrium unemployment benefits.
Proposition 1.2: The equilibrium tariff in a final-good sector is
tFi =
ILFi v(L
F
i )s
F
i F
iF + IKFi v(K
F
i )(1− sFi )F iF − bF iF
−(a+ b)M iFpi
+
(qi − q∗i )βi(F iFL )2
(pi − βiqi)F iFLLM iFpi
+
u2
(pi − βiqi)2F iFLLM iFpi
, (1.26)
where ILFi (I
KF
i ) is equal to one if labor (capital) is organized in that subsector and
equal to zero else, M iFpi are the net imports changes of final good i, if pi changes, and
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b is the aggregated national influence of lobbies.8
If we neglect the voting function v for a while, we find the equilibrium tariff of the
basic Grossman and Helpman model in the first fraction of the equation. If capital
owners earn all firm profits (sFi = 0), one gets exactly their expression for the equi-
librium tariff. If trade unions can extract a part of firms’ profit (sFi > 0), the first
fraction represents the (simplified) effect of lobbying with the inclusion of trade unions
as detected by Matschke (2004). Both lobby groups prefer a high tariff in their sector
and therefore lobbying increases a sector’s tariff as long as capital and/or labor is or-
ganized. The lobbying effects are additive and thus a tariff is largest if both capital
and labor lobby. Lobbies from all other sectors oppose tariffs as they reduce their
consumer surplus. Taking the voting functions into account, we observe that the tariff
on a final good increases with the number of voters organized in a lobby group within
that subsector, while it decreases with the number of voters organized in a lobby group
outside that subsector.
The effect represented by the second fraction of the equation is caused by the
demand βiF
iF for the sector-specific intermediate good in final-good production. A
higher tariff in the final-good sector increases its production F iF . Thereby the demand
for and the import of intermediate goods grow. Thus, it is possible to enlarge tariff
revenues of intermediate-good imports by increasing tariffs on final goods. The higher
the tariffs on intermediate goods tIi are, the more attractive is this option. A similar
effect can be found in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), where higher tariffs on
intermediate goods increase tariffs on final goods. Finally, high unemployment benefits
make a tariff on a final good more attractive, the more the tariff can ameliorate the
sectoral negative effects of unemployment benefits on social welfare. Those effects of
unemployment given by the last fraction of the equation are the same as in Matschke
(2004).
Up to now, we have seen that my model includes all well known effects of labor
market distortions and intermediate goods on tariffs on final goods. Keeping these
effects in mind, we can now have a look at tariffs on intermediate goods and analyze
their different structure in comparison to final-good sectors.
8The parameter b is in my setup not the share of individuals organized as in all other approaches.
As voting functions v are introduced, it describes the aggregated national influence of lobbies. It is
determined by b = 1N
∑n
i=1
∑
j=F,I(I
Lj
i v(L
j
i )L
j
i + I
Kj
i v(K
j
i )K
j
i ).
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Proposition 1.3: The equilibrium tariff in an intermediate-good sector is
tIi =
ILIi v(L
I
i )s
I
iF
iI + IKIi v(K
I
i )(1− sIi )F iI
−(a+ b)M iIqi
−I
LF
i v(L
F
i )s
F
i βiF
iF + IKFi v(K
F
i )(1− sFi )βiF iF
−(a+ b)M iIqi
+
b ·M iI
−(a+ b)M iIqi
+
(pi − p∗i )βi(F iFL )2
(pi − βiqi)F iFLLM iIqi
− βiu
2
(pi − βiqi)2F iFLLM iIqi
+
u2
q2i F
iI
LLM
iI
qi
, (1.27)
where ILIi (I
KI
i ) is equal to one, if labor (capital) is organized in that subsector, and
equal to zero else, M iI are the net imports of intermediate good i and M iIqi are the net
imports’ changes of intermediate good i, if qi changes.
As in final-good sectors both capital and labor lobbies lobby for high tariffs in
their own sector (first fraction of the equation). But, final-good producers are harmed
by tariffs on their inputs and thereby have an incentive to counterlobby against the
intermediate-good producers. This new effect on the equilibrium tariff in comparison to
tariffs on final goods is represented by the second fraction in the equation. If all interest
groups in a sector are organized, the effect of lobbying depends upon the size of the
subsectors, the number of voters that are organized and the demand for the interme-
diate good in final-good production. It can well be that lobbying of intermediate-good
producers is not sufficient to guarantee a positive tariff, as it is the case for final-good
producers in their subsectors. If final-good production F iF is large, needs many inter-
mediate goods (large βi) and represents many voters, final-good lobbies can dominate
the intermediate-good lobbies.
The consumer surplus is not affected by intermediate-good prices and thereby plays
no role in the tariff formation in intermediate-good sectors. But, while consumers are
not harmed by tariffs on intermediate goods, they are interested in positive tariffs on
imported intermediate goods to collect revenues. For the same reason, they oppose
tariffs in sectors in which intermediate goods get exported. Thus, as long as tariffs
are below (above) the revenue maximizing level, all lobbies try to increase (decrease)
the tariff level in importing (exporting) intermediate-good sectors. This effect enters
the equilibrium equation through the third fraction. While, as we saw above, tariffs in
final-good subsectors have effects on tariff revenues in intermediate-good subsectors,
tariffs in intermediate-good subsectors also influence tariff revenues in final-good sub-
sectors. Higher tariffs in the intermediate-good subsector lead to less production in the
dependent final-good subsector and thereby to more imports of final goods. Thereby,
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the tariff revenues increase if there is a tariff on final goods (until the revenue maximiz-
ing level is reached). This effect (the fourth fraction in the equation) makes a higher
tariff in the intermediate-good sector more attractive.
An interesting result describes the influence of unemployment benefits u on tariffs in
intermediate-good sectors. In contrast to final-good sectors, it is ambiguous whether
unemployment benefits have a positive or negative effect on tariffs on intermediate
goods. On the one hand, the higher the costs of unemployment in an intermediate-
good subsector are, the higher are the tariffs in that subsector. The reason is that a
tariff can alleviate the cost of unemployment via higher production and employment.
On the other hand, high tariffs on intermediate goods reduce the production in the
dependent final-good subsector. Thus, high unemployment costs in the final-good
sector make tariffs in the intermediate-good sector less attractive. The two effects
induced by unemployment benefits can be found in the last two fractions in the tariff
equation. Thus, the effect of unemployment benefits on intermediate-good sectors’
tariffs is not uniquely predictable. On the one hand it increases employment in the
intermediate-good sector, on the other hand it reduces employment in the final-good
sector. Which effect dominates depends upon the sensitivity of employment to price
and cost changes in both subsectors and the demand for the intermediate good in the
final-good production (βi).
To conclude the analysis of the equilibrium policy, we have a look at the economy’s
equilibrium unemployment benefits.
Proposition 1.4: The unemployment benefits in equilibrium are
u =
∑n
i=1
∑
j=F,I L
j
i (I
Lj
i v(L
j
i )(1− αjisji )− IKji v(Kji )αji (1− sji )− b(1− αji ))
−(a+ b)∑ni=1( (p∗i−βiq∗i )(pi−βiqi)2F iFLL + q∗iq2i F iILL )
Lobbying of labor unions has a positive influence on unemployment benefits as the
first summand in the numerator shows. Both labor unions in the final-good sectors
and in intermediate-good sectors benefit from unemployment benefits. The larger the
labor force in the organized sectors, the larger are those benefits. But, the higher
the quota of employment αji and the larger the bargaining power in wage bargaining
of workers sji , the smaller is the employees’ interest in unemployment benefits. The
rationale for the latter result is that workers with a strong position in wage bargaining
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do not need the outside option of unemployment benefits as much as workers with a
weak position. The capital owners lobby against unemployment benefits (the second
summand in the numerator). The larger the capital owners power in wage bargaining,
1−sji , the stronger are their incentives to prevent unemployment benefits and therefore
their lobbying. All lobby groups have a common interest to reduce unemployment
benefits, because they have to finance the benefits via per-capita taxes. This lobbying
of all organized interest groups results in the third summand in the numerator. The
larger the social costs of unemployment are, the smaller are unemployment benefits
in equilibrium. The social costs of unemployment are represented by the denominator
in the equilibrium equation. Higher tariffs on consumption goods (included in pi)
reduce the social costs of unemployment benefits and thereby increase equilibrium
unemployment benefits. For tariffs on intermediate goods (included in qi) the result is
ambiguous, as they are mainly a redistribution from final-good to intermediate-good
producers. This makes clear why statements on interactions between tariffs and labor
market distortions have to be treated carefully. Rama and Tabellini (1998) suggest that
it is possible to induce countries to reduce their labor market distortions by reducing
their tariff barriers. This conclusion hinges on the absence of intermediate goods. With
intermediate-good sectors it is not possible anymore to make such general predictions.
A (selective) reduction of tariffs could have no influence on labor market distortions or
even increase distortions.
1.4 Conclusion
My approach is the first that explains the tariff structure in intermediate-good sec-
tors using the seminal political economy framework for tariff formation by Grossman
and Helpman (1994). My approach turned out to be fruitful, as important differ-
ences in comparison to tariff formation in final-good sectors could be identified. As
empirics suggest, tariffs on final goods tend to be higher than tariffs on intermediate
goods. Additional insights in tariff formation are gained by the consideration of la-
bor interests. They have a different effect on tariffs in intermediate-good sectors in
comparison to final-good sectors. As already shown by Matschke (2004) and Rama
and Tabellini (1998), labor market distortions increase tariffs in final-good sectors. In
contrast to final-good sectors this chapter shows that for intermediate-good sectors
no unambiguous effects of labor market distortions are observable. It depends on the
industry structure, especially on the degree of dependency of the national production
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on the intermediate good, in which direction labor market distortions push tariffs in
intermediate-good sectors. Otherwise, tariffs influence the optimal level of labor market
distortions. While tariffs on final goods make labor market distortions more attractive
by reducing their social costs, this does not hold for tariffs on intermediate goods. They
reduce final-good production and can thereby increase overall unemployment. Thus,
it is not necessarily possible to put pressure on labor market distortions by reducing
tariffs as Rama and Tabellini suggest.
It remains for future research to examine whether the identified pattern of tariff
formation can be confirmed by empirics. Testable results of my model are the following:
The more interest groups are organized in the whole economy, the higher contributions
should be observable in final-good sectors. In intermediate-good sectors, the level of
contributions should be larger, the better organized the dependent final-good producers
are. In sectors in which all interest groups are organized, higher tariffs should prevail
on final goods in comparison to intermediate goods. In a country with large labor
market distortions, tariffs on final goods should be higher than in countries with more
liberalized labor markets. This effect should be weaker or even absent in intermediate-
good sectors.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to know how robust these results are to the in-
ternationalization of lobbying. It could well be that international lobbying has different
effects on tariffs on final in comparison to intermediate goods. This would e.g. be the
case, if it is easier for firms to lobby internationally than it is for consumers. Changes
in the equilibrium tariff structure could also occur if different organizational forms are
reflected in the tariff formation. In sectors in which a large share of intermediate-good
producers is vertically integrated, the policy game between final and intermediate-good
producers should be less intensive and thus contributions smaller. In those sectors,
the focus of the policy game should shift from national redistribution conflicts between
final- and intermediate-good producers to international redistribution conflicts between
suppliers of the same intermediate good. A final-good producer who owns its input
supplier could even be interested in a positive tariff on his input to protect his supplier
against import penetration.
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1.5 Appendix
Derivatives of welfare with respect to unemployment benefits
∂W
∂u
= u
n∑
i=1
(
(p∗i − βiq∗i )u
(pi − βiqi)2F iFLL
+
q∗i u
q2i F
iI
LL
)
∂WLFi
∂u
= LFi (1− αFi sFi ) +
LFi
N
· ∂r(p, q, u)
∂u
where
∂r(p, q, u)
∂u
=
n∑
j=1
(
(p∗j − βjq∗j )u
(pj − βjqj)2F jFLL
+
q∗ju
q2jF
jI
LL
− LFj (1− αFj )− LIj(1− αIj ))
∂WKFi
∂u
= −LFi αFi (1− sFi ) +
KFi
N
· ∂r(p, q, u)
∂u
∂WLIi
∂u
= LIi (1− αIi sIi ) +
LIi
N
· ∂r(p, q, u)
∂u
∂WKIi
∂u
= −LIiαIi (1− sIi ) +
KIi
N
· ∂r(p, q, u)
∂u
Derivatives of welfare with respect to tariffs on intermediate goods
∂W
∂qj
= (qj − q∗j )M I
′
j (qj)−
(pj − p∗j)βj(F jFL )2
(pj − βjqj)F jFLL
− βju
2
(pj − βjqj)2F jFLL
− u
2
q2jF
jI
LL
∂WLFi
∂qj
= −IijsFi βiF iF +
LFi
N
· ∂r(p, q, u)
∂qj
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where
∂r(p, q, u)
∂qj
= −(pj − p
∗
j)βj(F
jF
L )
2
(pj − βjqj)F jFLL
− βju
2
(pj − βjqj)2F jFLL
− u
2
q2jF
jI
LL
+ (qj − q∗j )M I
′
j (qj) +Mj(qj)
∂WKFi
∂qj
= −Iij(1− sFi )βiF iF +
KFi
N
· ∂r(p, q, u)
∂qj
∂WLIi
∂qj
= Iijs
I
iF
iI +
LIi
N
· ∂r(p, q, u)
∂qj
∂WKIi
∂qj
= Iij(1− sIi )F iI +
KIi
N
· ∂r(p, q, u)
∂qj
Derivatives of welfare with respect to tariffs on final goods
∂W
∂pj
= (pj − p∗j)MF
′
j (pj)−
(qj − q∗j )βj(F jFL )2
(pj − βjqj)F jFLL
− u
2
(pj − βjqj)2F jFLL
∂WLFi
∂pj
= Iijs
F
i F
iF +
LFi
N
· ∂(r(p, q, u) + s(p))
∂pj
where
∂(r(p, q, u) + s(p))
∂pj
= (pj − p∗j)MF
′
j (pj)−
(qj − q∗j )βj(F jFL )2
(pj − βjqj)F jFLL
− u
2
(pj − βjqj)2F jFLL
− F jF
∂WKFi
∂pj
= Iij(1− sFi )F iF +
KFi
N
· ∂(r(p, q, u) + s(p))
∂pj
∂WLIi
∂pj
=
LIi
N
· ∂(r(p, q, u) + s(p))
∂pj
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∂WKIi
∂pj
=
KIi
N
· ∂(r(p, q, u) + s(p))
∂pj
Chapter 2
The Risk of Vertical Specialization
for Strategic Trade Policy
2.1 Introduction
Export subsidies on final goods can give domestic exporters a strategic advantage over
their foreign competitors. With the support of a subsidy, domestic firms increase
their export volume and thereby gain market share and presumably profits in third
markets. Brander and Spencer (1985) have shown in their seminal paper that in case
of a domestic and a foreign firm acting as Cournot competitors the optimal policy
consists of a subsidy. Eaton and Grossman (1986) and Dixit (1984) have qualified this
result as they pointed out that with increasing competition the incentive to subsidize
vanishes and the optimal policy changes to a tax. Taking these approaches as a starting
point, a branch of the economic literature analyzed the optimal strategic trade policy
on final goods from a variety of perspectives.1
But, in recent years the focus of reserch has changed: As they play an increas-
ingly important role in world trade especially for industrialized countries, there is a
growing literature on the importance of intermediate goods for strategic trade policy.2
Bernhofen (1997) introduces a vertical stucture into the model of Brander and Spencer
(1985). In his approach, a foreign monopolist supplies inputs that both final-good pro-
1See, e.g., Spencer and Brander (1983), Davidson (1984), Dixit and Kyle (1985), Carmichael
(1987), Gruenspecht (1988), Rotemberg and Saloner (1989), Bagwell and Staiger (1992, 1994), and
Qiu (1994).
2See, e.g., Chang and Kim (1991), Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992), Rodrik and Yoon (1995),
Bernhofen (1997), Ishikawa and Lee (1997), Ziss (1997), Ishikawa and Spencer (1999), Chang and
Sugeta (2004), and Nese and Straume (2005).
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ducing firms need for their production. Thereby, the incentive to subsidize final-good
production is reduced as a subsidy not only shifts profits horizontally, but also verti-
cally. If the intermediate-good supplier can price discriminate between the final-good
producers, the optimal policy even changes to a tax on final-good production. Ishikawa
and Spencer (1999)3 analyze the role of intermediate goods in a model in which an in-
termediate and a final good are produced in two countries. With the assumption of
Cournot competition, an export subsidy aimed at shifting rents from foreign to domes-
tic final-good producers may also shift rents to foreign intermediate-good suppliers.
Thus, as long as a subsidy increases the price of the intermediate good, the desirability
of a subsidy is reduced if the intermediate-good producers are foreign. With a purely
domestic intermediate-good industry the argument for a subsidy is strengthen because
a subsidy reduces the efficiency loss induced by ’double marginalization’. Ishikawa and
Spencer also analyze the optimal trade policy toward the intermediate good. They do
so in a framework in which the domestic intermediate-good suppliers only serve the
domestic final-good producers. Thus, there will always be a subsidy as long as it shifts
profits horizontally in favor of the domestic country and reduces the intermediate-good
price.
The two mentioned approaches (and the literature on intermediate goods and strate-
gic trade policy in general) have in common that the industry distribution over coun-
tries is symmetric. It has not yet been a focus of research how strategic trade policy
changes, if there is one country where both intermediate-good and final-good indus-
tries are located and if there are two countries where only one (an intermediate- or
a final-good) industry is located. But, I think that this is a very interesting case, as
there is a trend in industrialized countries to concentrate on the production of final
goods and to outsource the production of intermediate goods.4 While there are many
good reasons to do so (especially from the firms’ point of view), there is a risk from the
perspective of strategic trade policy.5 With the consideration of intermediate goods,
as we have discussed above, the vertical rent shifting motive plays an important role
in strategic trade policy. Thus, a country that has both an intermediate-good and a
final-good industry has a strategic advantage over the vertically specialized countries,
as it has the possibility to use taxes or subsidies towards both industries. If for example
its final-good industry holds a large market share, it can subsidize intermediate-good
3and in a similar approach Ishikawa and Lee (1997).
4For empirical evidence on vertical specialization and its influence on world trade see Hummels,
Ishii and Yi (2001) and Chen, Kondratowicz and Yi (2005).
5For theoretic analysis of international outsourcing see Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Arndt (1997),
and Deardorff (2001). For the analysis of a firm’s decision see Spencer and Raubitschek (1996).
The Risk of Vertical Specialization for Strategic Trade Policy 29
production very aggressively, since most of the profits shifted vertically add to its own
welfare. The aim of this chapter is to analyze how strong the strategic advantage of the
non-specialized country is and how its policy affects the specialized countries’ policies.
To do so, we build a model in which all countries are engaged in strategic trade policy.
Thereby, we can directly compare the direction and intensity of trade policy in the spe-
cialized and non-specialized countries. To enrich the analysis, we consider asymmetric
costs of production both in the intermediate-good and the final-good industries. As
a benchmark case, we additionally analyze a framework in which industries are sym-
metrically distributed over countries. There, each of the four industries is located in
a different country. The benchmark case makes it easier to identify the effects of the
asymmetric industry distribution in my main case.
We show some interesting interactions between the non-specialized country’s pol-
icy in the intermediate- and final-good sector. Maximizing its intermediate-good pro-
ducer’s profits alone, a country would always subsidize its production. But, if increased
intermediate-good prices hurt the foreign more than the domestic final-good producer,
it can be that the non-specialized country taxes its intermediate-good production. The
maximization of the intermediate-good producer’s profits also influences the policy in
the final-good sector. Without the inclusion of intermediate-good profits, the subsi-
dization of final-good production increases with the relative efficiency of domestic in
comparison to foreign final-good production. The opposite can be true if domestic
intermediate-good profits are taken into account, because more profits can be shifted
vertically in case of an inefficient final-good production. Hence, the subsidization of
final-good production can be decreasing with the relative efficiency of production, if
the domestic intermediate-good producer captures a large share of the profits shifted
vertically. In general, we can show that a country with both kinds of industries acts
more aggressively in strategic trade policy than vertically specialized countries.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model and the
market equilibrium in the intermediate- and final-good market. We analyze the policy
equilibria of the two cases described above in section 2.3. In section 2.4 we finally
conclude.
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2.2 Model Structure and Market Equilibrium
We formalize a situation in which two monopolists located in two different countries
compete in an internationally integrated intermediate-good market.6 With an interna-
tionally integrated intermediate-good market not only the domestic final-good produc-
ers benefit from a subsidy (if it reduces intermediate-good prices), but also the foreign
final-good producers. Thereby, the policy toward the intermediate good gets more in-
teresting and there are richer interactions between the policies toward intermediate and
final goods. The assumption of an internationally integrated intermediate-good market
seems to be realistic as international trade agreements prohibit the price discrimination
of foreign final-good producers by tariffs between a growing number of countries. The
homogeneous intermediate good is needed for the production of a homogeneous final
good. The final good is also produced by two monopolists in two different countries.
The final good producing monopolists compete in a foreign consumer market. There
is Cournot competition in both final- and intermediate-good markets. We assume that
the final good producing firms take the intermediate-good price as given when commit-
ting to an output quantity. Thereby the intermediate-good producers get a first-mover
advantage.
Strategic trade policy is introduced by allowing policy makers to impose taxes
or subsidies on the production of each monopolist. Thereby policy makers can shift
profits both horizontally and vertically. In the section on policy equilibria we will
analyze two cases concerning the industry distribution over countries: In the first case
each monopolist is located in a different country, i.e. there are overall four countries.
The second case is the main contribution of this chapter. There one intermediate good
and one final good producing monopolist are located in one country, while the other
two monopolists are located in a second and a third country.
The modeled game has a three-stage structure. In the first stage the governments
simultaneously and independently determine the taxes (subsidies) on intermediate- and
final-good production. In the second stage the intermediate good producing monopo-
lists choose the quantities they want to supply to the intermediate-good market. In the
third and final stage the final-good producers choose the quantities they supply to the
6The internationally integrated intermediate-good market is modeled as it has similarly been
done by Nese and Straume (2005). They analyze a three-country case, in which in two countries
intermediate-good industries are located and in a third country a final-good industry is located.
While my model is based on their model, the focus of their research is very different. They mainly
analyze the influence of the degree of competitiveness in the intermediate- and final-good market on
strategic trade policy.
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consumer market given the supply in the intermediate-good market. In the following
we will solve this game by backward induction.
2.2.1 The Final-Good Market
The behavior of the firms is modeled as a Cournot duopoly. Both firms produce a
homogeneous final good. The price of the final good is determined by the inverse
demand curve
p = a− Y, (2.1)
where Y :=
∑2
i=1 yi is the total output supplied by the two final good producing
monopolists. For simplicity the demand curve is assumed to be linear. We assume
that the monopolists differ in their production efficiency and need αi units of the
intermediate good to produce one unit of the final good. This asymmetric need for
inputs is a very important feature of my model. Therewith, in equilibrium it can well be
that the less efficient final-good producer demands more inputs than the more efficient
final-good producer, even if the latter holds a larger market share. In a country in
which both an intermediate- and a final-good industry are located, a subsidy on final-
good production can then be more attractive the less efficient the own final-production
is (to increase the profits of the intermediate-good industry). This effect is absent in
other strategic trade policy models with intermediate goods in which αi is normalized
to one.7 The price of the intermediate good is denoted by w. Each government can
impose a tax or grant a subsidy tFi on its final-good production. The profits of the
final good producing monopolists can then be written as
piFi = (p− αiw − tFi )yi, i = 1, 2. (2.2)
In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium the outputs of the firms are given by
yi =
a− (2αi − α−i)w + tF−i − 2tFi
3
, i = 1, 2, (2.3)
and the overall supply of the final good sums up to
Y =
2∑
i
yi =
2a− (α1 + α2)w − (tF1 + tF2 )
3
. (2.4)
7See, e.g., Spencer and Jones (1992), Bernhofen (1997), and Ishikawa and Spencer (1999).
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Knowing the firms’ behavior in the final-good market one can analyze how the
intermediate-good firms behave in the second stage of the game.
2.2.2 The Intermediate-Good Market
Given the behavior of the final good producing firms, the monopolists producing the
intermediate good face the following demand for their goods:
X =
2∑
i
αiyi
=
(α1 + α2)a+ 2(α1α2 − α21 − α22)w − (2α1 − α2)tF1 − (2α2 − α1)tF2
3
. (2.5)
Given the demand, one can easily calculate the inverse demand function determining
the price of the intermediate good:
w =
(α1 + α2)a− (2α1 − α2)tF1 − (2α2 − α1)tF2 − 3X
2(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)
, (2.6)
where X :=
∑2
j=1 xj is the total output supplied by the intermediate-good producers.
The intermediate-good producers face constant marginal costs of production cj which
vary over the countries. Governments can impose a tax or grant a subsidy tIj on the
production of the intermediate good. The profits of the firms producing intermediate
goods are then given by
piIj = (w − tIj − cj)xj, j = 1, 2. (2.7)
The optimal outputs in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the monopolists producing
intermediate goods can now easily be calculated and are given by
xj =
(α1 + α2)a−
∑2
i (2αi − α−i)tFi + (α21 + α22 − α1α2)
9
(−4(tIj + cj) + 2(tI−j + c−j))
. (2.8)
In my linear framework, the taxes on intermediate-good production have an unambigu-
ous effect on the firms’ outputs. The domestic intermediate-good output xj decreases
with a domestic tax tIj , while it increases with a foreign tax t
I
−j. For the taxes t
F
i on
final-good production the results are not that simple. In most cases the outputs xj de-
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crease with taxes on final-good production. But, if one country has a strong efficiency
advantage in final-good production (2αi < α−i), the outputs xj of the intermediate
good are increasing with a tax imposed by that country. This effect is caused by the
less efficient monopolist’s high demand for intermediate goods. Since its market share
is increased by a tax on foreign production, this has a positive effect on the demand
for intermediate goods. This effect overcompensates the negative effect on the demand
that such a tax causes via a reduced final-good production.
The overall production of the intermediate good is then given by
X =
2∑
j=1
xj
=
2(α1 + α2)a− 2
∑2
i (2αi − α−i)tFi − 2(α21 + α22 − α1α2)
∑2
j(t
I
j + cj)
9
. (2.9)
Knowing the behavior of all firms involved in the game it is now possible to calculate
the equilibrium prices of the two kinds of goods and the equilibrium profits of the firms.
2.2.3 Market Equilibrium
In equilibrium the price of the intermediate good is given by
w =
(α1 + α2)a−
∑2
i (2αi − α−i)tFi + 2(α21 + α22 − α1α2)
∑2
j(t
I
j + cj)
6(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)
. (2.10)
As one would expect, the price of the intermediate good increases with the taxes
on intermediate-good production tIj . If the difference in the efficiency of final-good
production is not too large (2α1 > α2 and 2α2 > α1), the price is decreasing with
the taxes on final-good production tFi . The subsidization of final-good production
to gain market shares in the consumer market has in that case the negative effect
of shifting profits partially to the intermediate-good producers. If one country has
a strong efficiency advantage in final-good production (2αi < α−i), the price of the
intermediate good increases with a tax imposed by that country. In this case this
country can subsidize its final-good production and simultaneously reduce the price of
its input. Then, this country’s government obviously has a strong strategic advantage
over the competing country’s government.
Given the price of the intermediate good, one can calculate the equilibrium outputs
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of the final good:
yi =
(4α2i + 7α
2
−i − 7α1α2)a− (8α2i + 11α2−i − 8α1α2)tFi + (4α21 + 4α22 − α1α2)tF−i
18(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)
−2(2αi − α−i)(α21 + α22 − α1α2)
∑2
j(t
I
j + cj)
. (2.11)
The outputs yi decrease with the tax t
F
i on the output itself and increases with the
tax tF−i on the competing monopolist’s production. The taxes t
I
j on and costs cj of
intermediate-good production tend to decrease the outputs in the final-good sector as
they make their inputs more expensive. Only if one final-good producer is far more
efficient than its rival (2αi < α−i), its output yi increases with taxes tIj on and costs
cj of intermediate-good production. In that case, its rival suffers that much from a
higher input price (induced by higher taxes or costs), that the very efficient producer
strongly increases its market shares if the input price rises. This effect then dominates
the output reducing effect of increasing input prices.
The overall output of the final good is then given by
Y =
2∑
i=1
yi =
(11α21 + 11α
2
2 − 14α1α2)a−
∑2
i (4α
2
i + 7α
2
−i − 7α1α2)tFi
18(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)
−2(α1 + α2)(α21 + α22 − α1α2)
∑2
j(t
I
j + cj)
. (2.12)
The overall output Y of the final good unambiguously decreases with all taxes tIj and
tFi and with the costs cj of intermediate-good production.
Inserting the overall output in (2.1) allows to calculate the final-good price in equi-
librium:
p =
(7α21 + 7α
2
2 − 4α1α2)a+
∑2
i (4α
2
i + 7α
2
−i − 7α1α2)tFi
18(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)
+2(α1 + α2)(α
2
1 + α
2
2 − α1α2)
∑2
j(t
I
j + cj)
. (2.13)
It is easy to see that the price p of the final good increases both with taxes tIj on
intermediate and tFi on final goods.
Knowing the equilibrium outputs and prices, we can finally calculate the equilibrium
profits of the intermediate- and final-goods producers. The equilibrium profits in the
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intermediate-good sector are
piIj =
((α1 + α2)a−
∑2
i (2αi − α−i)tFi + (α21 + α22 − α1α2)
54(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)
(−4(tIj + cj) + 2(tI−j + c−j)))2
. (2.14)
The equilibrium profits piIj decrease with a tax t
I
j imposed on the monopolist’s
production and increases with a tax tI−j imposed on the rival’s production. In most
cases taxes tFi on final-good production decrease profits in the intermediate-good sector.
But, as already discussed for the equilibrium intermediate-good price, if one final-
good producer is far more efficient than its competitor (2αi < α−i), a tax tFi on its
production raises the profits of intermediate-good producers. This result is the first
major difference from the results of Ishikawa and Spencer (1999). In their model a
subsidy applied to final-good production always raises the profits of intermediate-good
producers.8 The reason is the separated intermediate-good markets in their model,
that neglect the effects a subsidy on final-good production has on the intermediate-
good market via the reduced final-good production of the foreign competitor.
The profits of the final good producing firms can be expressed as
piFi =
((4α2i + 7α
2
−i − 7α1α2)a− (8α2i + 11α2−i − 8α1α2)tFi + (4α21 + 4α22 − α1α2)tF−i
324(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)2
−2(2αi − α−i)(α21 + α22 − α1α2)
∑2
j(t
I
j + cj))
2
. (2.15)
Similarly as in the intermediate-good sector, firms’ profits piFi in the final-good sector
decrease with taxes tFi on their own production, while they increase with taxes t
F
−i
on their foreign competitor’s production. Again, in most cases the profits decrease
with taxes tIj on and costs cj of intermediate-good production. Only if one final-good
producer is far more efficient (2αi < α−i) than its foreign rival, his profits increase with
taxes on and costs of intermediate-good production.
Now that we have analyzed the firms’ behavior in the second and third stage of
my model, we can proceed by analyzing the optimal strategic trade policy in the first
stage of my model in the next section.
8In the case of linear demand.
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2.3 Policy Equilibria
In this section we analyze the government’s optimal policy in stage one of the trade
policy game given the behavior of the firms in stage two and three. The governments
in the countries act simultaneously and maximize their national welfare. The welfare
consists out of firm profits and tax revenues. We differentiate two cases. In the first
case, which serves as a benchmark case, each monopolist is located in a different coun-
try. Hence, there are four governments that play against each other in the trade policy
game. In the second case, which is the main contribution of my approach, there is an
asymmetric industry distribution over countries. On the one hand, there is one coun-
try where both an intermediate and a final good producing monopolist exist. On the
other hand, there are two countries which are specialized in the production of either
intermediate or final goods. The country with both kinds of industries probably has a
strategic advantage in trade policy, because it can shift profits from one of its industries
to the other. We want to analyze how big this advantage is and how much it depends
on the relative efficiency of production both in the intermediate- and final-good sector.
2.3.1 Trade Policy with a Symmetric Industry Distribution
Four independently and simultaneously acting governments maximize their national
welfare. The welfare consist out of firm profits and tax revenues. In the countries with
an intermediate-good producer the welfare is given by
W Ij = pi
I
j + t
I
jxj, j = 1, 2, (2.16)
while the welfare in the countries with final-good production is determined by
W Fi = pi
F
i + t
F
i yi, i = 1, 2. (2.17)
Best response functions. Given the results from the market equilibrium, one can
easily calculate each country’s best response function depending on the other gov-
ernments’ policy. We start with the analysis of the best response functions for the
intermediate good producing countries:
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tIj = −
(α1 + α2)a−
∑2
i (2αi − α−i)tFi + 2(α21 + α22 − α1α2)(tI−j + c−j − 2cj)
8(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)
. (2.18)
The intermediate good producing countries subsidize their production.9 Their main
incentive is to increase their market share in the intermediate-good market. The larger
the size a of the intermediate-good market is, the stronger is the incentive to subsi-
dize. Taxes on final-good production tFi tend
10 to reduce the intermediate-good sub-
sidies11 as they reduce the final-good production and thereby decrease the demand
for intermediate-goods. A tax of the other intermediate good producing country tI−j
increases the incentive to subsidize, as it makes the subsidy more effective. As in
all standard strategic trade policy models, the subsidy increases with the competing
countries marginal cost of production and decreases with the own marginal cost of
production. The impact of the own cost of production is twice as big as the impact of
the foreign cost of production.
The best response functions for the countries with final-good production are
tFi = −
(2α2−i − α2i + α1α2)((4α2i + 7α2−i − 7α1α2)a+ (4α21 + 4α22 − α1α2)tF−i
(8α2i + 11α
2
−i − 8α1α2)(10α2i + 7α2−i − 10α1α2)
−2(2α3i − α3−i + 3α1α2(α−i − αi))(tI1 + tI2 + c1 + c2)) . (2.19)
In the final good producing countries it is ambiguous whether the government
uses a tax or a subsidy. In most cases they use a subsidy to increase their market
share in the consumer market. But if country i is very unproductive in comparison to
country −i (αi > 2α−i), it uses a tax instead of a subsidy. In that case the incentive
to shift rents vertically and to collect tax revenues dominates the incentive to shift
rents horizontally. A tax tF−i on the production of the competing country’s monopolist
increases both in the case of a tax and of a subsidy the level of the trade policy in
the final good producing countries. The taxes tIj and the production costs cj in the
9In the following, if not stated otherwise, we take the assumption that the size of the final-good
market is sufficiently large in comparison to the marginal production costs of the intermediate good
(a >> cj , j = 1, 2) to ensure that a positive or negative derivative of a tax with respect to a decides
whether the tax is positive or negative.
10If country i’s final-good production is more than twice as efficient as country −i’s final-good
production (2αi < α−i), a tax of that country would increase the demand for intermediate goods.
The reason is that such a tax would increase the market share of the less productive country that
needs far more intermediate goods for its production.
11In the following we always speak about absolute values if we say a tax or subsidy is reduced or
increased.
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intermediate good producing countries have the same impact on the taxes in the final
good producing countries. In most cases these variables reduce the taxes or subsidies
in the final good producing countries as they reduce the profits that can be earned
by the final-good producers. Only if country i is more than twice as productive as
country −i (α−i > 2αi), the taxes and the production costs in the intermediate good
producing countries increase the tax or subsidy in country i. In that case an increase
in one of these variables reduces the profits of the competing monopolist that much,
that it improves the situation of the monopolist in country i and makes its government
act more aggressively in trade policy.
Equilibrium taxes. With the best response functions given in (2.18) and (2.19) we
can easily calculate the equilibrium taxes for simultaneously acting governments. The
equilibrium taxes on intermediate-good production are
tIj = −
(168(α51 + α
5
2)− 78(α41α2 + α1α42) + 141(α31α22 + α21α32))a+ (944(α61 + α62)
2(1160(α61 + α
6
2)− 3624(α51α2 + α1α52) + 7302(α41α22 + α21α42)− 8633α31α32)
−2928(α51α2 + α1α52) + 5820(α41α22 + α21α42)− 6860α31α32)c−j − (1376(α61 + α62)
−4320(α51α2 + α1α52) + 8784(α41α22 + α21α42)− 10406α31α32)cj , (2.20)
which is negative, i.e. the intermediate good producing countries always subsidize
their production.12 The more similar and smaller the costs in the final-good market
(similar and small αi’s) are, the larger is the incentive to subsidize the intermediate
good (see figure 2.1).13 As one would expect, a country’s subsidy increases with the
marginal production cost of the other country’s monopolist c−j and is decreasing with
the cost of its own monopolist cj. The (absolute) effect of the own cost is about fifty
percent higher than the effect of the foreign cost.14 My result can be compared to
a result of Nese and Straume (2005). They also show that both intermediate good
producing countries subsidize their production, if there is a monopoly in each country.
As in both models the countries simply compete for market share in the integrated
intermediate-good market, this is not a surprising result. We proceed with the analysis
of the taxes on final-good production.
12The derivative of tIj with respect to a is strictly negative.
13The derivative of tIj with respect to a has, e.g. its maximum on [0.5, 1.5]
2 at α1 = α2 = 0.5 and
increases if the larger of the αi’s gets reduced.
14The derivatives of tIj with respect to the cjs hardly vary with the αi’s.
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Figure 2.1: The derivatives of tIj with respect to a and the cjs in the four-country case.
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The taxes on final-good production are given by
tFi = −
(α1 + α2)(2α−i − αi)((104α4−i − 208αiα3−i + 273α21α22 − 169α3iα−i
(1160(α61 + α
6
2)− 3624(α51α2 + α1α52) + 7302(α41α22 + α21α42)− 8633α31α32)
+56α4i )a− (72α5i − 188α4iα−i + 292α3iα2−i − 252α2iα3−i + 136αiα4−i
−32α5−i)(c1 + c2)) . (2.21)
As in the intermediate good producing industries, the governments in the final
good producing countries also tend to subsidize their production (see figure 2.2). The
higher the productivity (the smaller αi) of country i’s production and the smaller the
productivity (the larger α−i) of the country −i’s production, the larger is the influence
of the market size a of the consumer market on country i’s trade policy. This is a
similar result as in Bernhofen (1997)15, where one foreign intermediate-good supplier
serves two final good producing monopolists. If the intermediate-good supplier prices
the monopolists uniformly, both government in the final good producing countries
subsidize their monopolist’s production. But, in my model it can also be that one
government in the final good producing countries imposes a tax on its production.
This is the case for country i, if country −i’s production is more than twice as efficient
as country i’s production. The costs cj of the intermediate good producing countries
have only a minor effect on the trade policy in the final good producing countries.
They have a slight tendency to reduce a subsidy or increase a tax, but there are also
parameter values, for which the costs influence the trade policy in the other direction.
Proposition 2.1: In the four-country case and with a >> cj (j = 1, 2), intermediate-
good production always gets subsidized: tIj < 0 (j = 1, 2). The subsidy (absolute value)
increases with the foreign cost of production c−j and decreases with the domestic cost of
production cj. The policy on final-good production is ambiguous. If foreign production
is not more than twice as efficient as domestic production (2α−i > αi)16, there tends to
be a subsidy on domestic production (tFi < 0). If foreign production is more than twice
as efficient as domestic production (2α−i < αi), there tends to be a tax on domestic
production (tFi > 0).
As I have already mentioned above, the results in our benchmark case with a
15In Bernhofen’s model the final-good producers are equally efficient (α1 = α2 = 1).
16This is the condition for ∂tIj/∂a to be equal to zero. Even with a >> cj , the exact point at which
the policy switches from a subsidy to a tax depends obviously on the cjs.
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Figure 2.2: The derivatives of tFi with respect to a and the cjs in the four-country case.
symmetric industry distribution confirm the results of the related literature. As a
new result we have shown, that if one final-good producer is far less efficient than its
competitor, the optimal policy on its production can be a subsidy instead of a tax. In
the next section, we analyze the case of an asymmetric industry distribution over three
countries. There the strategic trade policy will dramatically change in comparison to
the policy with a symmetric industry distribution.
2.3.2 Trade Policy with an Asymmetric Industry Distribution
We proceed with the case in which the industries are asymmetrically distributed over
three countries. There is one country where both an intermediate-good producer and a
final-good producer are located and there are two countries in which only one industry
(in one country a final, in the other an intermediate good producing monopolist) is
located. The asymmetric distribution of the industries will obviously influence the
strategic trade policy of all three countries. It is likely that the country with both
industries has a strategic advantage over the other countries. It can more aggressively
shift profits horizontally since part of the profits that are shifted vertically by such a
policy adds to its own welfare. The interesting question is how strong the advantage is
and how much it depends on the (relative) efficiency of the intermediate- and final-good
production in the three countries.
The non-specialized country (NSC) maximizes the profits of its two industries and
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the tax revenues collected:
W1 = pi
I
1 + t
I
1x1 + pi
F
1 + t
F
1 y1. (2.22)
The specialized countries (SCs) maximize the following welfare functions:
W I2 = pi
I
2 + t
I
2x2, (2.23)
and
W F2 = pi
F
2 + t
F
2 y2. (2.24)
Best response functions. As in the section before, we will first discuss the best
response functions. While the best response functions of the SCs are still the same
as in the four-country case, the best response functions of the NSC are different. The
NSC’s best response function for the intermediate-good sector is given by
tI1 = −
(11α31 − 18α21α2 + 21α1α22 − 4α32)a− (2α1 − α2)(2α21 + 5α22 − 2α1α2)tF1
2(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)(8α21 + 11α22 − 8α1α2)
+(11α31 − 15α21α2 + 18α1α22 − 10α32)tF2 + 2(2α2 − α1)(α21 + α22)(tI2 + c2)
−2(α21 + α22 − α1α2)(10α21 + 7α22 − 10α1α2)c1 . (2.25)
The NSC subsidizes its intermediate-good production as the derivative of tI1 with
respect to a is always negative.17 If the NSC subsidizes also its final-good production
(tF1 < 0), this tends to increase the subsidy in the intermediate-good sector.
18 This is
similar to the four-country case, in which subsidies on final-good production increase
the demand for intermediate goods and thereby the incentive to subsidize them. This
effect does not dominate the influence of the final good producing SC’s policy tF2 on
the NSC’s policy. It is ambiguous whether tF2 decreases or increases the NSC’s subsidy
on intermediate-good production. In many cases (α1 > 0.77α2) a tax on foreign final-
good production increases the NSC’s incentives to subsidize as such a tax increases the
17For (α1, α2) ∈ [0.5, 1.5]2.
18As long as 2α1 > α2.
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market share of the domestic final-good producer. Hence, more of the profits shifted
vertically by a subsidy add to the NSC’s welfare. The tax tI2 on and cost c2 of foreign
intermediate-good production tend to increase the NSC’s subsidy on intermediate-good
production. The effects of the policy on the final-good sector also play a role as the
influence of tI2 and c2 increases with the foreign efficiency parameter α2 of final-good
production and decreases with the domestic efficiency parameter α1.
19 If domestic
final-good production is very inefficient (α1 > 2α2), it can be that t
I
1 decreases with
tI2 and c2. As usual, the domestic cost c1 reduces the subsidy t
I
1 on the domestic
production.
The best response function for the final-good sector is given by
tF1 = −
(8(α41 + α
4
2) + 5(α
3
1α2 + α1α
3
2)− 6α21α22)a+ (2α2 − α1)2(8α21 + 5α22 − 5α1α2)
(56α41 − 112α31α2 + 192α21α22 − 136α1α32 + 71α42)
tF2 + 2(2α1 − α2)(α21 + α22 − α1α2)((7α21 + 4α22 − 7α1α2)(tI2 + c2)
−(2α21 + 5α22 − 2α1α2)tI1 − (11α21 + 14α22 − 11α1α2)c1) .
In contrast to the four-country case and the SC, the NSC unambiguously subsidizes
its final-good production. The derivative of tF1 with respect to a is strictly negative
and symmetrically dependent on α1 and α2. For the basic direction of its trade policy
it does not play a role whether the NSC’s final-good production is relatively less or
more productive than its foreign competitor’s. As we will see in the following, the
relative efficiency of its production anyhow plays an important role for the NSC’s
policy on final-good production. The NSC’s subsidy tF1 on final goods increases with
the competing countries tax tF2 on final goods. For all other variables, their effect on
the NSC’s policy is ambiguous. In most cases (2α1 > α2) domestic costs c1 and taxes
tI1 in the intermediate-good sector reduce the NSC’s subsidy on final goods, while the
foreign costs c2 and taxes t
I
2 increase the subsidy t
F
1 . As in the four-country case,
this correlation is reversed, if domestic production is far more efficient than foreign
final-good production (2α1 < α2). Having studied the best response functions of the
NSC, we now analyze the structure of the equilibrium taxes.
Equilibrium taxes. First, we have a look at the equilibrium subsidy the NSC
19If α1 < 2α2.
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grants on its intermediate-good production:
tI1 = −
3(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)(14α31 − 27α21α2 + 39α1α22 − 10α32)a+ 4α2
4(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)2(16α21 + 28α22 − 19α1α2)
(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)(2α31 + 8α21α2 − 11α1α22 + 10α32)c2 − (108α61 − 328α51α2
+663α41α
2
2 − 782α31α32 + 641α21α42 − 306α1α52 + 88α62)c1 . (2.26)
As one can easily see, the NSC’s trade policy in the intermediate-good sector de-
pends crucially on the efficiency of its final-good production in comparison to the
foreign final-good production. If one analyzes the derivative of tI1 with respect to the
market size a, one can see a clear trend (see figure 2.3):20 The subsidization is overall
more aggressive than in the four-country case. Surprisingly, it is even more aggres-
sive, when the domestic final-good producer is less efficient than its foreign competitor
(α1 > α2). The reason are the reduced costs of subsidization for the NSC. The very ag-
gressive trade policy on the one hand reduces the intermediate-good prices and thereby
the profits of the intermediate-good monopolists, but on the other hand increases the
profits of the final-good monopolists. This effect tends to be larger the more inputs
the NSC’s final-good producer needs and thus it is larger where the NSC’s monopolist
is less efficient than its foreign competitor.
But, it is worthwhile to notice that there are also parameter values (2α1 < α2) for
whom the NSC’s policy is less aggressive than the policy in the four-country case.21
The reason has already been given above. If the efficiency advantage of the domestic
final-good producer is very large, he does not benefit from small input prices anymore,
because they help his competitor more than himself. For (2α1 < α2), as we will see in
the next paragraph, the costs of intermediate-good production are more important for
the direction of trade policy (as ∂tI1/∂a is close to zero).
We now analyze how the influence of the marginal costs of intermediate-good pro-
duction on trade policy has changed in comparison to the four-country case (see figure
2.4). If the foreign final-good production is less efficient than the production in the
NSC (α2 > α1), the subsidy in the NSC increases with the foreign cost and decreases
with the domestic cost of intermediate-good production. The derivatives expressing
20Unfortunately a fifth order polynom does not yield unambiguous results, but in the graphs the
trends can be clearly identified.
21If one solely analyzes ∂tI1/∂a.
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Figure 2.3: The derivatives of tI1 and t
I
2 with respect to a in the three-country case.
the costs’ influence on the subsidy have a similar size as in the four-country case. For
α2 > 2α1, the NSC taxes its intermediate-good production, if the domestic cost of
intermediate-good production is sufficiently large in comparison to the foreign cost.22
If the foreign final-good production is more efficient than the production in the NSC
(α1 > α2), we observe that on the one hand the foreign cost c2 of intermediate-good
production has a smaller influence on the subsidy. On the other hand, the subsidy
reducing influence of the NSC’s cost c1 of intermediate-good production becomes
very large. As mentioned above, the NSC subsidizes the intermediate-good sector for
α1 >> α2 very aggressively. But, if in that case the domestic costs of intermediate-
good production are additionally very high, the subsidization does not pay off as most
of the profits shifted vertically benefit the foreign intermediate-good producer. Hence,
the domestic costs have a strong diminishing effect on the subsidy.
Proposition 2.2: In the three-country case and with a >> cj (j = 1, 2), the
NSC tends to subsidize its intermediate-good production. If domestic final-good pro-
duction is far more efficient than foreign final-good production (α2 >> 2α1) and if
c1 >> c2, the policy can switch to a tax. t
I
1 always decreases with the foreign cost
of intermediate-good production c2 and always increases with the domestic cost of
intermediate-good production c1.
22As mentioned above the ∂tI1/∂a is then close to zero.
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Figure 2.4: The derivatives of tI1 and t
I
2 with respect to the cjs in the three-country case.
We proceed by analyzing the non-specialized country’s policy in the final-good
sector. The equilibrium subsidy on final-good production is given by
tF1 = −
(7α21 + 10α
2
2 − α1α2)
2(16α21 + 28α
2
2 − 19α1α2)
a− 2(2α1 − α2)(8α
2
1 + 10α
2
2 − 9α1α2)
3(16α21 + 28α
2
2 − 19α1α2)
c2
+
(2α1 − α2)(59α41 − 128α31α2 + 219α21α22 − 154α1α32 + 88α42)
6(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)(16α21 + 28α22 − 19α1α2)
c1. (2.27)
The strategic trade policy in the NSC’s final-good sector deviates systematically
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from the policy in the four-country case. The first observation is that the NSC on
average subsidizes more (dependent on a) than the final good producing countries in
the four-country case (see figure 2.5). In the four-country case the subsidies on the final-
good production increase with the relative efficiency of the production in comparison to
the foreign competitor. The opposite is true for the NSC’s policy in the three-country
case. There, the subsidization dependent on the market size a is more aggressive, if
the domestic final-good production is less efficient than the foreign one (α1 > α2). The
reason is that the demand for intermediate goods increases strongly with subsidies on
inefficiently produced final goods. Therefore, vertical rent shifting is in that case more
efficient. Interestingly, the derivative of tF1 with respect to a has a similar size as in
the four-country case in which domestic production is relatively most efficient. This
supports the argument that the stronger subsidization discussed above aims at vertical
rent shifting. Obviously, the NSC should shift profits vertically only if the domestic
monopolist earns a large share of the profits in the intermediate-good market. This is
ensured by the NSC’s policy towards final-good production depending on the cost of
intermediate-good production.
Figure 2.5: The derivatives of tF1 and t
F
2 with respect to a in the three-country case.
In the four-country case the trade policy in the final good producing countries
hardly depends on the costs cj of intermediate-good production. This is completely
different in the three-country case, in which they play an important role (see figure
2.6). As mentioned above they are used to controll the vertical rent shifting. In-
creasing foreign costs of intermediate-good production tend to increase the subsidy
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on final-good production and increasing domestic costs tend to reduce the subsidy.
The derivatives of tF1 with respect to both costs increase (in absolute values) with the
relative efficiency of the foreign intermediate-good production. Thereby, the influence
of the costs is strongest for values of α1 and α2 for which also the vertical rent shifting
with respect to a is most intensive.
Proposition 2.3: In the three-country case and with a >> cj (j = 1, 2), the
NSC always subsidizes its final-good production. The influences of the costs cj of
intermediate-good production on the subsidy tF1 are ambiguous. If 2α1 ≥ α2, tF1
decreases (increases) with the foreign (domestic) cost of intermediate-good production
c2 (c1), otherwise it increases (decreases) with c2 (c1).
Altogether, we have seen how the NSC tailors its trade policy in both domestic
sectors to optimally shift profits both vertically and horizontally. We now analyze
whether and how the NSC’s policy influences the policy of the two countries where
only an intermediate- or a final-good monopolist is located. We start with the trade
policy of the intermediate good producing SC:
tI2 = −
27α2
6(16α21 + 28α
2
2 − 19α1α2)
a+
(16α21 + 46α
2
2 − 19α1α2)
3(16α21 + 28α
2
2 − 19α1α2)
c2
−(68α
4
2 − 109α1α32 + 132α21α22 − 64α31α2 + 32α41)
6(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)(16α21 + 28α22 − 19α1α2)
c1 (2.28)
As the best response functions of the SCs’ are the same as in the four-country case,
all changes in the SCs’ tax structure in comparison to the taxes in the four-country case
are caused by the NSC’s trade policy. By analyzing the derivative of tI2 with respect to
the market size a, one can already see that the NSC’s policy influences the intermediate
good producing SC’s policy (see again figure 2.3). First of all, as a reaction to the NSC’s
aggressive policy, the SC’s subsidization is less intensive than in the four-country case.
The derivative is additionally slightly influenced by the efficiency parameters (αi) of
final-good production. The only explanation for this asymmetry is the (asymmetric)
trade policy of the NSC on its intermediate (and final) good production. The SC’s
subsidization (depending on a) is stronger when the NSC’s policy is less aggressive
(α1 < α2) and weaker when the NSC’s policy is more aggressive (α1 > α2).
The derivatives of tI2 with respect to the costs ci of intermediate-good production
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Figure 2.6: The derivatives of tF1 and t
F
2 with respect to the cjs in the three-country case.
The Risk of Vertical Specialization for Strategic Trade Policy 50
are as well affected by the efficiency parameters (αi) of final-good production (see again
figure 2.4). While they have a similar shape as in the four-country case for α2 > α1,
where also the NSC’s policy is similar to the four-country case, they are very different
for α1 > α2, where the NSC’s policy deviates systematically from the four-country case.
Proposition 2.4: In the three-country case and with a >> cj (j = 1, 2), the
SC always subsidizes its intermediate-good production. tI2 always decreases with the
foreign cost of intermediate-good production c1 and always increases with domestic cost
of intermediate-good production c2.
That the policy in the country specialized in final-good production is also influenced
by the NSC’s policy should already be clear. What this influence looks like can be seen
in the corresponding tax function:
tF2 = −(
(α1 + α2)(2α1 − α2)
16α21 + 28α
2
2 − 19α1α2
) ·
(a+
(6α31 − 11α21α2 + 14α1α22 − 8α32)
3(α21 + α
2
2 − α1α2)
c1 − 4
3
α2c2) (2.29)
The policy depending on the market size a is hardly affected by the asymmetric
industry distribution over countries (see again figure 2.5). The derivative with respect
to a has a similar shape (with a bit smaller values) as in the four-country case, which
means that the subsidy (a tax for some parameter values) increases, the more efficient
the own and the less efficient the foreign final-good production is. The influence of the
NSC can be clearly seen in the effect that the costs of intermediate-good production
have on the SC’s trade policy (see again figure 2.6). While these costs have hardly any
influence on the trade policy of the final good producing countries in the four-country
case, they are here, as a reaction to the NSC’s policy, dependent on these costs. The
costs have the opposite influence on the taxes as they have on the taxes of the NSC.
For parameter values of the αi’s, where the costs of intermediate-good production
tend to increase the subsidies in the NSC, they tend to decrease the subsidies in the
SC and the other way round.
Proposition 2.5: In the three-country case and with a >> cj (j = 1, 2), final-
good production does not always get subsidized by the SC. If foreign production is
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not more than twice as efficient as domestic production (2α1 > α2)
23, there tends
to be a subsidy on domestic production. Otherwise, there tends to be a tax on do-
mestic production. The influences of the costs cj of intermediate-good production on
tF2 are ambiguous. If 2α1 ≤ α2 or 1.1α1 > α2, tF2 decreases with the NSC’s cost
of intermediate-good production c1, otherwise it increases with c1. If 2α1 ≤ α2, tF2
decreases with the other SC’s cost of intermediate-good production c2, otherwise it
increases with c2.
We have seen in this section that the governments of the SCs act in pursuance with
the NSC’s policy. Unfortunately, an analysis of the welfare effects is not feasible in my
framework. But it seems plausible to state that the more aggressive trade policy of the
NSC is a sign for a strategic advantage over the SCs. This strategic advantage clearly
leads to larger market shares for the NSC in comparison to the four-country case (for
the same parameter values). Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the specialization
in one kind of industry leads to a reduced welfare, at least from the perspective of
strategic trade policy. It is absolutely clear that this is only one aspect and it would be
invalid to conclude that the specialization on one industry is hurtful. But its influence
on strategic trade policy should not be neglected and taken into consideration in the
development of industrial policy.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter examined the implications of internationally integrated intermediate-good
and final-good markets for strategic trade policy if there is Cournot imperfect competi-
tion in both markets and both goods are assumed to be substitutes. Special attention
is given to the interactions between the policy towards intermediate- and final-good
production in a non-specialized country where both kinds of goods are produced. We
show that there are strong interactions. If increased intermediate-good prices hurt the
foreign more than the domestic final-good producer, it can be that the non-specialized
country taxes its intermediate-good production. On the other hand, the maximiza-
tion of the intermediate-good producer’s profits influences the NSC’s policy towards
the final-good sector. If intermediate-good profits were not included, the subsidiza-
tion of final-good production would increase with the relative efficiency of domestic
23This is the condition for ∂tF2 /∂a to be equal to zero. Even with a >> cj , the exact point at
which the policy switches from a subsidy to a tax depends obviously on the cjs.
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in comparison to foreign final-good production. The opposite can be true if domestic
intermediate-good profits are taken into account, because more profits can be shifted
vertically in case of an inefficient final-good production. Therefore, the subsidization
of final-good production can decrease with the relative efficiency of production, if the
domestic intermediate-good producer captures a large share of the profits shifted ver-
tically. Additionally, it is analyzed whether a non-specialized country has a strategic
advantage over countries in which only intermediate or final goods are produced. We
can show that a country with both kinds of industries acts more aggressively in strate-
gic trade policy than vertically specialized countries. Thus, it can be concluded that
the non-specialized country’s profits plus the tax revenues in both sectors (at least the
sum over both sectors) are larger than those in the specialized countries.24 Therefore,
at least from the perspective of strategic trade policy, countries take a risk, if they ver-
tically specialize in final- or intermediate-good production. Especially, if the country
they internationally compete against is not vertically specialized and has the ability to
influence the world market prices by its policy.
Finally, I want to emphasize that, due to the high structural complexity and the
asymmetry of my model, I had to make concessions concerning the generality of the
functional forms and the market structure. We assumed Cournot competition in both
the intermediate-good and the final-good market. Each industry consists out of one
monopolist with linear cost functions. By analyzing monopolists we rule out the terms
of trade effect. This effect arises when there is more than one firm. Since the firms
do not take into account the effect of their exports on the exports of other firms, their
overall production goes beyond the joint profit maximizing level. Then the government
has an incentive to reduce the overall production by imposing a tax (see Eaton and
Grossman 1986 and Krishna and Thursby 1991). As these effects were not in the
focus of my research, we used a simpler framework with monopolies. Even though
my framework may exclude some interesting cases, it provides new insights into the
functioning of strategic trade policy.
24Of course only for the same parameter values.
Chapter 3
Education Choice with Social
Preferences
3.1 Introduction
Both, family background and social environment have strong effects on a child’s edu-
cational attainment. Empirics show that having parents with positive characteristics
like high income, good educational level or high occupational status improves a child’s
probability of educational and occupational success (see, e.g., Solon 1992, Mulligan
1997, Robertson and Symons 2003, and Fuchs and Wo¨ßmann 2006). To find expla-
nations for the importance of family background for educational attainment theory
mainly concentrates on the better exogenous opportunities a child with wealthy or well
educated parents faces. Typical explanations are the family transmission of ability, im-
perfect capital markets, local segregation or self-fulfilling beliefs.1 In contrast, I think
that not only the better opportunities but also the higher incentives to learn are re-
sponsible for the better educational performance of richer children. Before discussing
where this higher incentives stem from, we introduce the second main issue of this
chapter. Similar as in the case of a good family background, empirics also show that
a good social environment has a positive influence on a child’s educational success.
Having friends or classmates (a peer group2) with a good family background, good
grades in school or ambitions for a high social status seems to increase a child’s educa-
tional attainment (see, e.g., Simpson 1962, Hoxby 2000, Sacerdote 2001, Hanushek et
1A broader summary of these theories can be found in section 3.4.
2’Peer group’ is a common expression in education theory, but it is not narrowly defined. In many
papers the peers are just all other students in class, in other papers only some students in class and in
further papers also friends are included that need not to be in same class as the analyzed individual.
Education Choice with Social Preferences 54
al. 2003, and Robertson and Symons 2003). As they are empirically well established,
economists often append peer group effects to their models, but rarely examine their
nature. I think that it is important to detect the channel through which a peer group
influences a child’s educational success. Do peers automatically transfer ability to a
child (spillover effects) or do they somehow shape its education choice? In my opinion
the latter is the case and that similarly to the family background also peers influence
a child’s incentives to get educated.
Why do I think that both family background and social environment influence an
individuals’ incentives to learn? From my point of view an individual’s education choice
is not only about maximizing lifetime income. Individuals do additionally care about
their relative wealth (income) in comparison to others. Economists try to formalize the
idea that individuals are also concerned about the income other people receive in models
of social preferences.3 Recent experimental studies underline the importance of social
preferences in individuals’ economic decisions.4 As the (time) investment in education
is one of the most important economic decisions for an individual’s lifetime income,
it is worthwhile to analyze how social preferences change it. If individuals compare
themselves with others, one gets a natural link between their education choice, their
family background and their social environment (peers).
To consider the comparison with others in education choice is not totally new to
the literature and has already been formulated by Merton (1953) and Boudon (1974).
Their reference group theory states that individuals compare their social achievements
to the reference group from which they come from. They assume that individuals care
for maintaining their social status and thereby get the result that upper class children
are more motivated to make human capital investments than lower class children. But,
the result is more or less driven by assumption. A microfoundation for why individuals
suffer from losing social status is missing. I think that my more general way of modeling
can explain the persistent inequality across generations without the use of education-
specific assumptions.
Another theoretic approach related to my model is developed by Akerlof and Kran-
ton (2002). They assume that students sort into groups at school (’nerds’, ’leading
crowd’ and ’burnouts’). Every group has its own ideal behavior that the students
try to fulfill. Since similar students tend to sort in the same group and then have a
3See, e.g., Bolton (1991), Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000),
and Andreoni and Miller (2002).
4See Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Fehr and Gaechter (2000), Henrich et al. (2001), and Charness
and Rabin (2002).
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bias towards the group’s ideal, the group members have correlations in their education
choice. Their and my approach are similar, since in Akerlof and Kranton’s model the
individuals suffer from being different than their group’s ideal, while in my approach
the individuals suffer from being different than their peers. But, from my point of
view, in Akerlof and Kranton’s model an explanation is missing why students sort into
groups and where their ideals come from.
The theory reflecting social preferences I use in my model is the concept of inequity
aversion introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).5 They state that individuals do not
only care about their material self interest, but also about their relative income in
comparison to a reference group. Individuals’ utility gets reduced both from being
better off and from being worse off than the reference group. With a utility function
that captures this idea, Fehr and Schmidt can explain experimental evidence that is
inconsistent with the assumption of purely self-interested individuals. As argued above,
I think that inequity aversion plays an important role in education choice and hence
integrate Fehr and Schmidt’s utility function into an education choice model. In my
model an individual lives two periods. The first period is called adolescence and the
second period working life. In both periods the individual’s utility depends on its
income and its relative income. We assume that an individual compares its income to
a peer group which consists of friends, classmates and relatives.6 In adolescence the
individual receives its education, in working life its income is depending on the time
invested in education in adolescence and on its ability. Income in the first period is
partly financed by parents and partly by earnings that can be realized by investing
time in a job in adolescence.
With my framework, we get the following results: The education choice of inequity
averse individuals deviates systematically from the education choice of purely self-
interested individuals. Inequity averse students who are in adolescence relatively poor
in comparison to their peer group invest less time in education than students who are
relatively rich in comparison to their peers. The reason for relatively poor students to
choose less education is their higher opportunity costs of education. If they work in
adolescence, they can reduce the income gap in comparison to their peers and thereby
reduce their losses induced by inequity aversion. For inequity averse individuals it is
5My model would yield qualitatively the same results, if I used the alternative formalization of
inequity aversion introduced by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). I use Fehr and Schmidt’s utility function
because it generates clearer results in my framework.
6In experiments the reference group, an agent compares himself with, are just the other players
involved in the game. In real life situations it is not totally clear which persons an individual uses as
reference points.
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additionally no longer true that investment in education strictly increases with ability.
For almost all exogenous parameter values of my model there are intervals of ability
in which investment in education decreases with ability. If parental income is symmet-
rically and uniformly distributed around the peer group’s income, time investment in
education (averaged over ability) increases with the peer group’s income. The reason
is that having a rich peer group in working life gives additional incentives to choose
a high level of education, while having a poor peer group in working life reduces the
incentives to choose a high level of education.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model and the out-
come of an individual’s education choice is calculated. We analyze how the education
choice of inequity averse individuals differs from the education choice of purely self-
interested individuals in section 3.3. In section 3.4 we discuss the role family back-
ground plays in my model and compare the results to the related literature. Then,
we do the same for peer groups in section 3.5. In section 3.6 we discuss my model’s
implications for education policy, before section 3.7 finally concludes. The appendix
contains the proofs of my propositions and some figures that illustrate an individual’s
education choice.
3.2 The Model
The model analyzes how individuals choose their education level. Each individual
lives for two periods, adolescence a and working life w. The income per period is xi
with i = a, w.7 An adolescent visits schools and other educational institutions. His
educational success (i.e. human capital at the end of education) depends on his initial
ability (or talent) θ at the moment of school enrollment8 and his time investment in
education e. Ability θ is drawn from some distribution F with support (0, θ].9 Besides
in education an adolescent can invest his time endowment H¯ in work h and in leisure
l. The return to work in adolescence is assumed to be independent of ability and
equal to the time invested. I think this assumption is realistic since most of the jobs
7All variables and parameters in my model could have an index j to symbolize that they are
individual. We completely suppress such an index, but we always talk about individually varying
variables and parameters in my model.
8Initial ability in our sense is surely already influenced by parental education and social environ-
ment. Nevertheless, we neglect all pre-school influences as they would not change the education choice
described in my model.
9The upper ability limit θ is introduced for technical reasons. It can be arbitrary large as long as
it is finite. It will later on be specified more precisely.
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one does parallel to education do not reward special intellectual abilities or hitherto
existing educational success. In adolescence income xa is the sum of a share of parental
income γp and own income h. That a child’s income increases with its parents’ income
seems plausible as both direct transfers (pocket money) and common consumption
(habitation, food, car, etc.) should typically be positively correlated with parents’
income. In working life income is the wage times the ability θ times the time invested
in education e (plus 1). For simplicity, we normalize the wage, time endowment H¯ and
the share of parents’ income γ to 1. We assume capital market imperfections, i.e. it is
not possible to take a credit on future income in adolescence. This assumption should
come close to reality as borrowing (before or during education) on future income evokes
strong adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
We formalize the utility derived from income by the Fehr/Schmidt utility function.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) state that people are not only motivated by their material self-
interest. At least experimental evidence suggests that many people are also concerned
with their relative income in comparison to others (Fehr and Schmidt 2003). Many
people suffer from being worse off than others (envy) and some people suffer from being
better off than others (altruism). Fehr and Schmidt call people inequity averse, if they
are envious in the case they are worse off and/or altruistic in the case they are better
off than others. For people with inequity aversion the return to an additional unit of
income is larger if they are worse off and smaller if they are better off than others in
comparison to purely self-interested people. I think that people are not only inequity
averse in the laboratory, but also in real life situations. If that is the case, inequity
aversion will also influence an individual’s education choice. With its education choice
a child does not only determine its future income, but also its future losses induced
by inequity aversion. We assume that an individual compares itself with a peer group.
A peer group in real life consists of relatives, colleagues (class mates) and friends. A
strong assumption in my model is that the peer group does not change over time. This
is a benchmark case and surely not realistic for most people. But, in my opinion it is
convenient for two reasons. Firstly, at least a part of most people’s peer group should
be constant over time (relatives, some friends) and secondly, at the time an adolescent
takes its education choice he can probably not foresee how his peer group will change
in future. Even for a partly dynamic peer group (e.g. adjusting to the individual’s
income) the results of the model would qualitatively carry through. For simplicity, we
assume that there is only one person in an individual’s peer group (the representative
peer) with income y. Thereby, the utility functions for adolescence and working life
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are given by
Ua = l + h+ p− αmax[y − (p+ h), 0]− βmax[(p+ h)− y, 0], (3.1)
Uw = θ(1 + e)− αmax[y − θ(1 + e), 0]− βmax[θ(1 + e)− y, 0], (3.2)
with y, p ≥ 0, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and β ≤ α.10
We do not discount working life utility in my two-period model, since that would not
provide interesting insights for the questions we are dealing with. Hence, lifetime utility
sums up to
U = Uw + Ua = l + h+ p+ θ(1 + e)
−αmax[y − (p+ h), 0]− βmax[(p+ h)− y, 0]
−αmax[y − θ(1 + e), 0]− βmax[θ(1 + e)− y, 0]. (3.3)
All in all, an individual has to solve the following maximization problem to optimize
his education choice:
max
l,h,e
l + h+ p+ θ(1 + e)− αmax[y − (p+ h), 0]− βmax[(p+ h)− y, 0]
−αmax[y − θ(1 + e), 0]− βmax[θ(1 + e)− y, 0],
w.r.t.
l, h, e ≥ 0,
l + h+ e ≤ 1. (3.4)
As the second condition is always binding, we can simplify the problem to
max
h,e
1− e+ p+ θ(1 + e)− αmax[y − (p+ h), 0]− βmax[(p+ h)− y, 0]
−αmax[y − θ(1 + e), 0]− βmax[θ(1 + e)− y, 0],
w.r.t.
h, e ≥ 0,
h+ e ≤ 1. (3.5)
10The assumptions on the values of α and β are taken over from Fehr and Schmidt (1999). They
proved to be consistent with the data and imply that people are at least as envious as altruistic. This
seems to be a reasonable assumption. β ≤ 1 ensures that utility does not decrease with income.
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In the simplified problem a positive derivative with respect to work or education means
that the respective variable is more attractive than leisure. We first calculate the
parameter values for which this is the case. For parameter values for which both
derivatives to work and education are positive, we then have to check whether work
of education is more attractive, i.e. which derivative is larger. For 0 ≤ h < y − p the
derivative of U with respect to h is positive:
∂U
∂h
= α. (3.6)
For p > y or h > y − p > 0 the derivative of U with respect to h is negative:
∂U
∂h
= −β. (3.7)
This means that as long as an individual is worse off than its peer it prefers work to
leisure in adolescence. Otherwise it prefers leisure. To compare the attractiveness of
work and leisure with the attractiveness of education we need to calculate the derivative
of U with respect to e. For 0 ≤ e < y
θ
− 1 the derivative is
∂U
∂e
= θ − 1 + αθ. (3.8)
For y ≤ θ or 0 < y
θ
− 1 ≤ e the derivative is
∂U
∂e
= θ − 1− βθ. (3.9)
The first part of both derivatives θ−1 is the return to education minus the opportunity
costs of less leisure without inequity aversion. With inequity aversion the individual
has an additional incentive to learn (αθ) as long as it is worse off than its peer in
working life. As soon as it is better off than its peer the inequity aversion reduces its
incentive to learn (−βθ).
Now, it is possible to calculate the levels of θ that make education more attractive
than leisure and work. As already mentioned leisure is superior to work for y ≤ p or
0 < y − p ≤ h. Therefore, in this case education is chosen, if it is superior to leisure.
The individual prefers education to leisure if the derivative of U with respect to e is
positive. In case 0 ≤ e < y
θ
− 1 this holds for
θ >
1
1 + α
. (3.10)
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In case y ≤ θ or 0 < y
θ
− 1 ≤ e the derivative is positive if
θ >
1
1− β . (3.11)
In the case, the individual prefers work to leisure (0 ≤ h < y − p), the individual
chooses education, if the return to education is larger than the return to work α. For
0 ≤ e < y
θ
− 1 this is true for
θ > 1. (3.12)
For y ≤ θ and 0 < y
θ
− 1 ≤ e it holds for
θ >
1 + α
1− β . (3.13)
As we have seen, the level of θ is very decisive for the decision of the individual. This
makes it helpful to differentiate our analysis by the level of θ. As seen above, the
following cases for θ have to be considered: θ ∈ (0, 1
1+α
], ( 1
1+α
, 1], (1, 1
1−β ], (
1
1−β ,
1+α
1−β ]
or (1+α
1−β , θ].
11 We start the analysis with the very lowly talented and proceed with
increasing levels of ability. In each case, the return to education and work depends
among other things upon their own levels (e and h). Hence, it is helpful to start the
analysis for each case by setting the choice variables equal to zero. Then, we can
compute the level up to which the individual can set the variable with the highest
return (for e = h = l = 0) without changing the ranking in the attractiveness of the
variables. If this level is smaller than 1, at least one of the other variables will also
be positive in the optimum. In the following calculation of the variables, I always
mention the variable with the highest return first, then the variable with the second
highest return and finally the variable with the lowest return.
Case 1: θ ∈ (0, 1
1+α
]
For individuals with a very low ability it is never optimal to invest time in education.
Even if they are worse off than the peer in their working life and have an additional
incentive to learn by their inequity aversion, their return to education (θ(1+α)) is still
smaller than the return to leisure (see equation 1.1). If the individual is worse off than
11In the following we assume θ > 1+α1−β . As we will see time investment in education is always equal
to one for θ > 1+α1−β . Hence, the exact level of the upper ability limit θ does not play a role for the
further analysis.
Education Choice with Social Preferences 61
its peer in adolescence it prefers work to leisure to reduce its inequity aversion losses.
If it is able to close the income gap to the peer by work in adolescence, it invests the
rest of its time in leisure. Thus, the time investments are:
h = max {0,min {1, y − p}} ,
l = 1− h = min {1,max {0, 1− y − p}} ,
e = 0. (3.14)
Case 2: θ ∈ ( 1
1+α
, 1]
In this case, education would still be inefficient without inequity aversion. But,
if the individual would be worse off than its peer in working life (y > θ), education
has a higher return than leisure (θ(1 + α) > 1), at least as long as the income gap in
working life is not closed by education. But, if the individual is worse off than its peer
in adolescence, it still prefers work to both education and leisure, because in this case
the returns to work are largest (1 + α). Therefore, the individual invests its time as
follows:
h = max {0,min {1, y − p}} ,
e = max {0,min {1, 1− y + p, y/θ − 1}} ,
l = 1− h− e. (3.15)
Case 3: θ ∈ (1, 1
1−β ]
Without inequity aversion it would now be optimal to choose only education. But,
if increasing education leads to higher inequity in working life (individual is better off
than its peer), this reduces the returns to education to θ(1−β). Then leisure becomes
superior to education. On the other hand, if the individual is worse off than its peer
in adolescence and not worse off in working life, inequity aversion raises the return to
work above the return to leisure and education (1+α > 1 ≥ θ(1−β)). If the individual
is worse off than its peer in working life, education is always optimal. In summary, the
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individual will choose the following levels of time investment:
e = max {0,min {1, y/θ − 1}} ,
h = max {0,min {1, y − p, 2− y/θ}} ,
l = 1− h− e. (3.16)
Case 4: θ ∈ ( 1
1−β ,
1+α
1−β ]
In this case, the ability and with it the return to education is that large that the
individual chooses education even if this creates larger inequity in working live. Hence,
it will never choose leisure. The only possibility for work to be more attractive than
education is that both work reduces inequity in adolescence and education increases
inequity in working live (θ(1−β) < 1+α). In all other situation the individual chooses
only education. To summarize the education choice in this case:
e = max {min {1, 1− y + p} ,min {1, y/θ − 1}} ,
h = max {0,min {1, y − p, 2− y/θ}} ,
l = 0. (3.17)
Case 5: θ ∈ (1+α
1−β , θ]
This is the simplest case in the analysis. Ability is large enough to dominate all
incentives not to learn induced by inequity aversion. Therefore, the clear outcome of
the individuals maximization problem is
e = 1,
h = 0,
l = 0. (3.18)
By analyzing these five cases, we have finished the formal calculation of the individual’s
education choice. In figure 3.1 one can see how an individual’s investment in education,
work and leisure12 changes with its ability θ and parental spending p for some given
12In the figures investments are differentiated by colors. In areas with only one color the investment
in the corresponding activity is equal to 1, in the other activities equal to 0. In areas with more than
one color the time investment is divided between the corresponding activities. The more dominant
a color in such an area is, the higher is the investment in the corresponding activity. But, I have to
mention that the coloring is not everywhere absolutely precise.
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parameters of inequity aversion α and β and peer’s income y. The figure illustrates
only one possible outcome and differs much, if y’s relative size in comparison to α
and β changes. Further figures that depict outcomes for alternative values of y can be
found in the appendix. In the next section we compare the education choice of inequity
averse and purely self-interested individuals.
Figure 3.1: Education choice with a large peer income y
3.3 Inequity Aversion and its Effects on Education
Choice
In this section we analyze how inequity aversion shapes my results and compare them to
the results for purely self-interested individuals. We try to figure out how changes in the
parameters of inequity aversion influence the results. Then, we discuss shortly whether
the individual level of inequity aversion should be treated as something determined or
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changeable in practical questions.
3.3.1 Inequity Aversion vs. Pure Self-Interest
In models of education choice with purely self-interested individuals time investment
in education strictly increases with ability as long as future income increases with edu-
cation. A very simple formalization13 of a purely self-interested individual’s education
choice is
U(e) = θe− 1
2
e2 (3.19)
where first best investment in education e∗ is equal to ability θ (with wages per knowl-
edge unit equal to 1). In my linear model a purely self-interested individual (α = β = 0)
would choose an investment in education equal to 0 for θ < 1 and an investment equal
to 1 for θ ≥ 1. How does inequity aversion (α, β > 0) change this result? The most
important outcome is that investment in education does not increase with ability any-
more. For almost all possible vectors of the other exogenous parameters of the model
(p, y, α, β) there exists an interval of θ in which investment in education decreases with
θ. To make the analysis more precise it is useful to distinguish two cases: In the
first case the individual’s parents are relatively rich14 in comparison to its peer group
(p > y), in the second case it is the other way round (y > p+ 1).15
In the first case, the individual has no incentive to work in adolescence, as it is
anyway better off than its peer group. Therefore, it has only to decide whether to invest
in leisure or in education. If peer income is not extremely large or small (y < (1+α)−1 or
y ≥ 2(1−β)−1), individuals with smaller values of θ16 invest in education in comparison
to purely self-interested ones. The result is caused by the additional incentives to learn
induced by inequity aversion. If the individual would be worse off than its peer without
education in working life, even lowly talented individuals decide to learn in order
to reduce future inequity. But, with increasing ability less time has to be invested
in education to equalize future income with the peer’s income. When incomes are
equalized, the additional incentives to learn do not only vanish, but altruism reduces
13For a more elaborated formalization of a purely self-interested individual’s education choice see
Bishop (2006). Also in his framework, in which many additional influences on education choice are
considered, effort invested in education strictly increases with ability.
14In the following we call individuals whose parents are relatively rich in comparison to their peer
group relatively rich individuals and proceed accordingly in the case of relatively poor parents.
15We analyze the case, in which a full time investment in work cannot close the income gap to the
peer group in adolescence. The third case, in which the income gap can be closed (p+ 1 > y > p), is
a bit more complicated, but yields qualitatively the same results.
16(1 + α)−1 < θ ≤ 1
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the incentives to invest more time in education. Thus, more talented17 individuals
only invest that much time in education to equalize incomes and thereby investment
in education decreases with ability in this interval. Highly talented individuals18 fully
invest in education because their returns to education are large enough to compensate
the reduction of incentives caused by inequity aversion. For extremely small or large
peer incomes education increases with ability. In case of an extremely small peer
income, only very untalented19 individuals have an additional incentive to learn because
they are worse off than their peer group in working life. But, even with this additional
incentive to learn leisure is still superior to education because of their very low ability.
Hence, only individuals with θ > (1 − β)−1 invest in education, if peer income is
extremely small. In case of an extremely large peer income, only very talented20 can
reach a higher income than their peer group in working life. But, as already mentioned,
their ability is large enough to compensate the altruistic losses. Therefore, in case of
extremely large peer incomes every individual with θ > (1 + α)−1 invests all its time
in education.
In the second case we analyze, the peer group’s income is clearly larger than
parental spending (y > p + 1). Then, work always dominates leisure, since even full
time investment in work cannot close the income gap to the peer in adolescence. Thus,
the return to work is always equal to 1 + α in that case. For θ < 1 work dominates
education, because the return to education even with inequity aversion can only be
θ(1 + α). For θ ≥ 1 education dominates work if y > θ which means that without
education the individual would be worse off than its peer in working life. In the case we
are analyzing here, there is always a θ > 1 for which education dominates work, as y is
strictly larger than 1. The individual invests as much time in education as is necessary
to equalize the own with the peer’s income. If that is not possible, it invests its whole
time endowment in education. But, similarly as in the first case, with rising ability
less time investment in education is necessary to close the income gap to the peer and
thereby investment in education decreases with ability in this interval. Exceptions,
for which investment in education increases with ability, are as in the first case ex-
tremely small21 and large peer incomes. With the same argumentation as above this
is the case for y < (1+α)−1 and y ≥ 2(1+α)
1−β . We sum up the results in a first proposition:
171 < θ ≤ (1− β)−1
18θ > (1− β)−1
19θ < (1 + α)−1
20θ > (1− β)−1
21Only possible for p+ 1 ≥ y > p.
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Proposition 3.1: With inequity aversion (α, β > 0) and a representative peer’s
income y with y ∈ ((1 + α)−1, 2(1 − β)−1) for p > y or y ∈ (1, 2(1+α)
1−β ) for y > p + 1
investment in education e is not increasing with ability θ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The upper analysis shows that individuals that are relatively rich in comparison
to their peers invest on average more time in education than individuals that are rela-
tively poor. The reason are the higher returns to work for the poor in comparison to
the returns to leisure for the rich individuals. Thereby, opportunity costs of education
for the relatively poor individuals are larger than for the relatively rich individuals.
We state this result as a proposition here and will discuss it in more detail in section
3.4 of this chapter.
Proposition 3.2: All other parameters (α, β, y) constant, relatively rich individ-
uals (p > y)22 invest on average (over θ) strictly more time in education than relatively
poor individuals (p < y). For a given ability θ relatively rich individuals invest at least
as much time in education as relatively poor individuals.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The next question we try to answer is whether inequity averse individuals tend to
invest on average more or less time in education than purely self-interested individ-
uals. We have observed up to now that inequity averse individuals with low ability
more often invest in education than purely self-interested individuals, while inequity
averse individuals with high ability on average invest less time in education. Caused
by the multiplicity of potential cases it is unfortunately not feasible to give a clear
characterization under which circumstances (parameter values) average23 investment
in education is larger or smaller than with purely self-interested individuals. But, if
we again use the differentiation between relatively rich (p > y) and relatively poor
(y > p + 1) individuals, we get clearer results. For relatively rich individuals the
overall effect of inequity aversion is ambiguous. On the one hand, the larger α (envy),
the more relatively rich ones invest in education.24 On the other hand, the larger β
(altruism), the less highly talented invest in education, since they suffer more from
22We have to assume some arbitrarily large, but finite upper limit p to ensure that differences on
finite intervals of p have an effect on average investment in education.
23over the level of ability
24The larger α, the more lowly talented are motivated to learn, because their future losses induced
by envy increase.
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being better off than their peers in future. Which of the both effects dominates can
not be answered in general and depends on the relative size of α in comparison to β.
For relatively poor individuals the effect of inequity aversion is unambiguous. They
on average invest less time in education. Since their incentives to work are quite large
(1+α), they will never invest in education for θ < 1. This is the same threshold as for
purely self-interested individuals. But, purely self-interested individuals invest all their
time in education for θ ≥ 1. This is not the case for relatively poor individuals with
inequity aversion.25 They suffer from being better off than their peers and invest for
θ ∈ [1, 1+α
1−β ) only that much time in education to equalize their income with the peer’s
income in working life. As this interval increases with α and with β, both envy and
altruism reduce the (average) investment in education of relatively poor individuals.
Envy increases the opportunity costs of education, because it increases returns to work
in adolescence and altruism reduces the returns to education in the case the individual
can be better off than its peers by choosing a high level of education. Therefore, there
are less individuals that invest in education than in the case of purely self-interested
individuals. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.3: For relatively rich individuals (p > y) it is ambiguous whether
they invest (on average) more time in education with inequity aversion (α, β > 0) or
without inequity aversion (α, β = 0). Their average investment in education increases
with envy α, but decreases with altruism β. Relatively poor individuals (y > p + 1)
invest on average strictly less time in education with inequity aversion. Their average
investment in education decreases both with envy α and altruism β.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Finally, we turn our attention to the role of the peer’s income. To analyze how
an increasing peer income influences the individuals’ investment in education, we
make the assumption that the parental spending p is uniformly and symmetrically
distributed around the representative peer’s income y. This is a benchmark case as
the peer income is equal to the expected value of parental spending. Thereby, an
increasing peer income does not change the probability of being better or worse off
in adolescence, while it raises (reduces) the probability of being worse (better) off in
working life. Nevertheless, as a positive correlation between parental and peer income
seems plausible, it is worthwhile to analyze this benchmark case. As its incentives to
get educated are increased if an individual is worse off in working life, inequity averse
25As long as y < 2 · 1+α1−β .
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individuals on average invest more time in education the larger the peer’s income.
With a smaller, but positive correlation between parental and peer income the positive
effects of an increasing peer income would still exist, but be reduced by an increasing
probability of being worse off in adolescence. Before we start with a new section, we
summarize these last results in a forth proposition:
Proposition 3.4: If parental income p is uniformly and symmetrically distributed
around the representative peer’s income (p ∼ U(y − a, y + a) with a < y), the average
(time) investment in education of inequity averse individuals (α, β > 0) increases with
the representative peer’s income y.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In this section we showed how strongly inequity aversion changes the outcome of an
individual’s education choice. I think these new insights should not be neglected in the
theoretical analysis of educational problems. For the question which recommendations
for practical problems can be deduced from my results, it is important to clarify whether
one treats inequity aversion as something predetermined or something that can be
modified by exogenous influences. We discuss this question in the next section.
3.3.2 Inequity Aversion - Determined or Changeable?
As we have seen, the introduction of inequity aversion into a model of education choice
changes the results of such a model significantly. From a perspective that aims at an
efficient education system, in which highly talented invest much in education, while
lowly talented invest less, inequity aversion distorts the outcome of education choice
away from the optimum. But, it is also clear, that the individuals in my model behave
totally rational and optimize their individual investment in education and thereby
their individual welfare. Thus, taking the variables α, β, y and p as given, there is
no possibility for education policy or parents to reduce the distortion in the children’s
education choice. In this section we will briefly discuss whether the inequity aversion
parameters α and β should be taken as determined or changeable. The discussion how
the variables y and p effect education choice follows in the next two sections of this
chapter.
In the literature about inequity aversion it is shown that α and β are heteroge-
neously distributed over population (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Where inequity aversion
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comes from and how it is individually determined has not been focus of research up
to now. Because of the variation of social preferences within societies, I believe that
the individual level of inequity aversion can be at least partly influenced by parental
education. Parents can promote values to their children and envy and altruism are
surely two values parents are interested in. In my opinion, both values can be pro-
moted independently. Parents can educate children to be very altruistic, envious or
both. Also across societies there is evidence for variation of social preferences. Henrich
et al. (2001) show the importance of economic and social environment for social pref-
erences in a cross-cultural study. They find a strong behavioral variability in games
with social interaction across 15 small-scale societies. Group-level differences in eco-
nomic organization and the degree of market integration explain a substantial portion
of the behavioral variation across these societies. Therefore, I think that societies can
promote values mainly indirect by setting economic or social frameworks that award
envious, altruistic or self-interested behavior.
Before we close this section, we point out what the result of a change in the param-
eters would be. Proposition 3.3 tells us that an increase in envy would increase the
investment in education of relative rich individuals and would reduce the investment
of relative poor individuals in education. An increase of altruism unambiguously de-
creases the investment in education. Whether and how parents and especially society
could and should influence the parameters, we will discuss in detail in section 3.6.
3.4 Family Background
Empirical evidence suggests that family background is an important determinant of a
child’s educational success. Robertson and Symons (2003) show that both parental so-
cial class and parental academic achievement have strong positive effects on academic
attainment. Similarly, Fuchs and Wo¨ßmann (2006) find that many family charac-
teristics have an influence on a student’s educational performance. Performance e.g.
increases with the parents’ level of education and is larger if parents have a white rather
than a blue collar job. Solon (1992) finds a strong intergenerational income correlation
for the United States. As long as one thinks that income is correlated with education
this finding supports the positive correlation between parents’ income and children’s
educational success. Mulligan (1997) estimates both intergenerational correlation of
wealth and of earnings. He finds that the correlation coefficients for consumption and
total income fall in the 0.7-0.8 range, while the intergenerational correlation of earnings
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is about 0.5.
As empirics find a positive intergenerational income correlation it is up to theory to
find a convincing explanation for it. Piketty (2000) gives an excellent summary of the
most prominent theoretical explanations for persistent inequality and intergenerational
mobility. One possible explanation for intergenerational income correlation could be
the high costs of education, especially in the US, combined with imperfect capital
markets. If that was the main reason for intergenerational income correlation, this cor-
relation should be very low in many European countries where even higher education
is mainly for free. But, Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) show that there is also a strong
intergenerational income correlation in Sweden, a country in which, e.g., tuition fees
are not allowed. A very obvious channel explaining why inequality can persist across
generations is the transmission of wealth from parents to children through inheritance.
But with regard to the results of Mulligan (1997), wealth transmission cannot explain
the intergenerational correlation of earnings (0.5), but only the additional part (0.2-0.3)
in the intergenerational correlation of wealth. A further explanation for the intergener-
ational correlation of earnings could be the family transmission of ability. Transition of
ability can both mean genetic and cultural transmission. Plug and Vijverberg (2003)
try to estimate how much of all ability relevant for schooling is genetically passed on.
They find that at least 50 percent of ability is genetically transmissed. Otherwise,
Sacerdote (2002) shows that being raised in a family with a high socioeconomic status
greatly increases the probability to attend college also for adoptees. A theory closely
related to mine is the reference group theory formulated by Merton (1953) and Boudon
(1974). According to this theory, the intergenerational persistence of labor earnings
inequality follows from the intergenerational transmission of ambition and taste for
economic success. While the story behind this theory is very similar to mine, the
formalization is quite different. They state that agents care to maintain their social
status. Thereby, agents with upper-class origins have higher incentives to be successful
on the labor market than agents with lower-class origins. But, by stating that agents
care to maintain their social status, the result that upper-class origins are more suc-
cessful in education is introduced more or less by assumption. Other explanations for
the importance of family background in education choice are imperfect capital markets,
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local segregation26 and self-fulfilling beliefs27.
I do not want to state that the mentioned explanations for the importance of fam-
ily background are wrong or not important in reality. But, my model provides an
alternative and, as I think, convincing explanation, why family background plays an
important role in education choice. My explanation’s advantage is the minor use of
education specific assumptions. We just introduce an established utility function (Fehr
and Schmidt 1999) into an education choice model and can show that having relatively
rich parents improves a student’s academic attainment.
There are two channels how family background influences education choice in my
model. Both are driven by the relative position of an individual in comparison to its
peers. The first channel works through the individual’s relative position in adolescence.
This relative position is mainly determined by parental income. If an individual is
better off than its peers, it can concentrate on education. An individual that is worse
off than its peers has an incentive to work to reduce its losses induced by inequity
aversion. Thereby its education choice is downward biased in comparison to relatively
rich individuals. This result does not say anything about the effect of the absolute level
of parental income on education choice, but I think it is reasonable to assume that the
probability of being better off than one’s peers increases with parental income. But
it can obviously well be the case that someone with poor parents is relatively rich
in comparison to his peers, while someone with rich parents can be relatively poor
in comparison to his peers. To get a second effect of parental income on education
choice, one needs the additional assumption that peers’ income is positively correlated
with parental income as in proposition 3.4.28 This seems to be absolutely plausible
as peer groups typically consist out of friends in the neighborhood, schoolmates and
relatives. For all of this groups one should observe (at least a week) positive correlation
of income with an individual’s parental income. With this assumption individuals with
rich parents have a higher incentive to learn, as they want to avoid to be worse off than
their rich peers in working life. In contrast, individuals with a poor background do
26Benabou (1993) develops a model in which both costs of high education and of low education
depend negatively on the fraction of one’s neighbors choosing to obtain a high education (positive
external effects of education). If the external effects on the costs of high education are larger than on
the costs of low education, housing prices in a high education area are larger and segregation into a
rich neighborhood with high education and a poor neighborhood with low education takes place.
27If, e.g., one group in the society is discriminated on the labor market, their incentives to invest
in education are reduced and they get on average less educated than the not-discriminated. Then, the
employers observe their smaller educational level and their discriminatory beliefs are reconfirmed.
28This assumption obviously reduces the effect in adolescence we just described. But, as long as
this correlation is smaller than 1, the first effect would not disappear.
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not suffer that much from being poor in working life, since their peers are poor, too.
Therefore, their average effort in education is smaller in comparison to individuals with
a rich background.
In this section, we tried to show that the introduction of inequity aversion into an
education choice model provides an alternative explanation for the empirically estab-
lished importance of family background for educational achievement. Our explanation
focuses on a student’s incentives and not on his exogenous opportunities. I think that
my model’s advantage is its simple structure and the small number of assumption that
has to be made. In the next section we discuss where peer effects in school come from
and whether my model provides new explanations for the existence of these peer effects.
3.5 Peer Effects
In this section we discuss peer effects. The empirical literature suggests that having
’good’ classmates and friends improves a students’ academic attainment. What being
a ’good’ student means is not totally clear in the empirical literature and we will
discuss it in the further analysis. While there are many empirical studies, theoretical
explanation for the existence of peer effects are rare. In the next section of this chapter,
we will summarize the empirical evidence concerning peer effects in school. Then, we
will analyze whether my model can provide a convincing theoretical explanations for
peer effects and discuss how other theoretical approaches explain these effects. We are
mainly interested in a student’s education choice at the microlevel and analyze how
the composition of a group of students can endogenously determine their motivation
and attitude.
3.5.1 Empirical Evidence
As already mentioned there exists a lot of empirical research on peer effects. We
concentrate only on a few of these studies, which we consider to be the most important
ones for the analysis of a student’s education choice at the microlevel.
As one of the first studies on this topic, Simpson (1962) analyzes the academic
ambitions of students with a working class and with a middle class background. His
empirical analysis suggests that both peers and parents have an influence on students
ambitions. The more middle class peers a middle-class or working-class student has,
the higher are his occupational aspirations. But, not only the peers’ social background
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is important, also their aspirations play a role. The more peers with high aspirations a
student has the higher are his own aspirations. Therefore, it cannot be distinguished by
Simpson’s results whether peers’ aspirations or peers’ social status increase a student’s
own aspirations.
Sacerdote (2001) shows that not only aspirations but also academic outcomes are
influenced by peers. He analyzes a data set on first year students from Dartmouth
College that are randomly assigned to share a room.29 Even within this group of
highly selected college age students he finds a strong correlation between the grade
point averages of roommates. Where this correlation comes from cannot be derived
from the data. It could both be a knowledge spillover or a mutual motivation.
Hoxby (2000) and Hanushek et al. (2003) analyze peer effects in the classroom.
Both find a positive influence of peer achievement on student achievement. As an
interesting result Hoxby finds that peer effects are stronger intra-race. From my point
of view this indicates that peer effects are not only spill-over effects, but depend also on
the personal relationship between students. If one believes that there are more intra-
than inter-race friendships in school and students take friends as reference points, the
fact that peer effects are stronger intra-race would confirm the results of my model.
A further paper that underlines the importance of peer groups is Robertson and
Symons (2003). They find strong evidence that having classmates coming from higher
socioeconomic groups improves the academic attainment of students. As the stud-
ies above, they are not able to trace the channel by witch the peer group influences
attainment. As an interesting result they find diminishing returns to average peer qual-
ity. Additionally they analyze differences in peer effects in schools with and without
streaming (also called tracking or ability grouping). They find that those placed in the
top stream benefit from attending streamed schools, while most of the students placed
in the low ability stream suffer from attending a streamed school. Within the students
placed in the top stream, those with lowest ability profit most, while in the low ability
stream those with the highest ability suffer most. Interestingly, the best students in
the top stream hardly benefit from attending a streamed school. This seems to indicate
that for the explanation of peer effects relative positions within a group of students are
more important than the average level of ability. Otherwise the positive effect of being
in the top stream should be the same for all students in that group. Other empirical
29A similar analysis has been done by Zimmerman (2003). He analyzes data from Williams College
and gets comparable results.
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studies30 on streaming have more mixed results. While most of the studies find that
high-ability students gain from streaming and low-ability students suffer from stream-
ing, the evidence which students in each ability group suffer or gain is mixed. Hence,
some of results of Robertson and Symons (2003) are still controversial in the literature.
All the above mentioned approaches and most of the further literature have in
common that peers influence a student’s educational attainment or aspiration. How
the peers influence each other is empirically difficult to detect. In the next section we
try to find a convincing theoretical explanation for the peer effects.
3.5.2 Theoretical Explanations
As we saw in the last section, it seems to be an empirical fact that having ’good’ peers
in a class or as friends improves a child’s academic attainment. What this ’good’ means
is not that clear. It varies from peers’ parental characteristics like socioeconomic class,
occupational status, aspirations and education to peers’ characteristics like grades,
abilities and aspirations. Since many of these variables are highly correlated, it seems
empirically hardly possible to identify the decisive variable. It could also well be that
several of these variables contribute to the peer effects. In this section we want to
discuss the way these variables influence a child’s academic performance. Are peers
somehow exogenously transferring ability or knowledge to the child or do they endoge-
nously influence its education choice? An exogenous spillover explanation could only
be that a child profits from spending time with ’good’ peers inside or outside class.
With regard to the empirical studies mentioned above it seems to be more plausible
that peers are shaping an individual’s education choice. Peers can be role models,
confirm or subvert motivation or, as in my model, be reference points.
The advantage of my model is its general setting. The utility function is not tailored
for the specific topic we deal with. But, the other side of the coin is that the model
misses some specific aspects that are probably important for the peer group effects in
school. The main problem of my model in the school context is the exogenous peer
income. While, as we argued in section 3.2, the peer group’s income in adolescence
and working live is positively correlated and thereby our assumption of a constant peer
income is a useful benchmark for the analysis in section 3.4, it is only partly convenient
in this context. To support my model one could argue that having more peers in class
30See, e.g., Argys et al. (1996), Betts and Shkolnik (2000), Figlio and Page (2002), Galindo-Rueda
and Vignoles (2003), Meghir and Palme (2005), and Hanushek and Wo¨ßmann (2006).
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with parents from high socioeconomic groups increases an individual’s average peer
group income. As average investment in education tends to increase with peer’s income
in my model (compare benchmark figures 3.2 and 3.6), one would observe a positive
effect of ’good’ peers on academic attainment. Unfortunately, we cannot prove this
result in general, but rather need the assumption that parental income is uniformly
and symmetrically distributed around peer income (see Proposition 3.4). Without this
assumption, there can well be intervals of y in which average investment in education
decreases with the peer’s income. What is missing in my model and probably important
in the school context, is the interaction of students.31 In my opinion inequity aversion
plays an important role in these interactions and it is left to future research to analyze
this question in a formal way. What we can state here is that on the one hand having
well performing peers in class provides inequity averse students additional incentives to
invest in education. On the other hand having bad peers in class reduces the incentives
to invest in education for students. To support this statement one can argue in two
ways. Firstly, students could not only care for material inequity, but also suffer from
inequity in other performance measures like in this case grades. Secondly, from a more
economic perspective, grades in school can be interpreted as signals for future success
on the labor market. A student with well performing peers in class gets the signal that
he will have (relatively) little success on the labor market in comparison to his peers.
If he is inequity averse, this signal makes him to invest more time in education. The
opposite is true for a student with badly performing peers in class. He gets the signal
that he will have more success than his peers in working life, hence inequity aversion
reduces his incentives to invest in education.
With this line of argumentation one can explain the above mentioned empirical re-
sults concerning schools with and without streaming by Robertson and Symons (2003).
With inequity aversion it is obvious that the effect of streaming is largest for those stu-
dents who are located close to the threshold level that decides whether students are
sorted into the high- or the low-ability stream.32 In an unstreamed school these stu-
dents have an average ability and thus are hardly influenced by their inequity aversion.
In a streamed school those placed in the low ability stream are the best students in
their group and their inequity aversion reduces their incentives to invest in education.
31Amodel developed by Lazear (2001) reflects how students could influence each other by disrupting
the class. From my point of view his approach is only partly convenient as a student’s disruption
probability defines whether he is a good or bad student. Then, it is optimal to segregate good from
bad students. In such a framework it would be interesting to link a student’s and his peers’ ability with
his probability to disrupt the class. Then, one would get clearer arguments for or against segregation.
32If the students are divided into two groups.
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Those placed in the top stream are the worst students in their group and their incen-
tives to invest in education are increased by inequity aversion. Those students who
were already among the best (worst) students in the unstreamed school do hardly face
changes in their incentives, if they attend a streamed school. Their relative position in
the class stays the same as they are still among the best (worst) students.
Before finishing this section we want to mention an approach that formalizes a
related idea about interaction of students in school. Akerlof and Kranton (2002) build
a model in which students are not only interested in their academic attainment, but
also seek to behave in line with their personal identity. As insights from sociology
suggest, students in Akerlof and Kranton’s model can choose one of three identities
in school. Depending on their own abilities students decide to become a ’jock’, ’nerd’
or ’burnout’. Each of this group has its own identity, which every member of a group
wants to meet. Thus, this identity biases the education choice of each group member in
the same direction and thereby reduces inequity within these three groups of students.
The close connection to the theory of inequity aversion is obvious. From my point of
view this approach goes in the right direction, but it has quite restrictive assumptions
that yield the results. It takes the existence of the three (or more) mentioned identities
as given. Every student has to take one of the identities as his ideal. It is natural that
the model has the outcome of three different groups of students that tend to behave
in line with their chosen identity. What is missing is a justification why there should
not be other identities and most important where these identities come from. It would
be interesting to develop a model that can explain why students tend to sort into such
groups and how identities are generated in a class.33 Not surprisingly, I suggest that
inequity aversion could help to explain these observations. If one can choose its own
reference group it is natural to select similar students as peers as this minimizes losses
induced by inequity aversion.
3.6 Education Policy
Education policy is a complicated task in many ways. While there are some factors
that directly and in an objective way influence the quality of education (e.g. quality of
teachers, teaching methods, design of exams), many other issues are complicated to deal
33Bishop et al. (2004) develop a model about student culture and norms and thereby try to explain
the tendency to conformity within some schools. Students harass better students to reduce the better
students’ academic attainment because they want to improve their academic rank in school. Thereby
they want to increase their expected future income and self-esteem.
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with. The first problem one has to solve is the formulation of the objectives of education
policy. Should policy aim at the maximization of average academic attainment or at
education efficiency from an individual point of view, which would mean that the
marginal return to education equals the marginal cost of education? Should education
policy try to support weaker students or to build an elite? But, there is at least one
objective most people agree on: Academic and occupational success should not depend
on parental wealth and social background. As my model provides mainly insights into
this topic, we will concentrate our discussion on this issue.
What drives the social differences in educational outcomes in my approach is the
envy of the relatively poor individuals in adolescence. Since it is not in the scope of
education policy to reduce the inequality in the parental generation, politicians could
act in two directions. They could try to reduce either the inequity aversion of students
(if that is possible) or the subjective perception of inequity. What do we mean by that?
As we argued in section 3.3, we think that envy and altruism are at least in parts a
product of education and economic and social environment. While the government can
hardly influence the values parents promote to their children, it can decide which values
are promoted at school. Concerning the subjective perception of inequity, there can
be several ways to reduce it at school. The installation of all-day schools for example
reduces the amount of decisions a student has to take that depend on his income. If
e.g. sportive and cultural activities would be offered at school free of charges, every
student would have the same opportunities to spend his free time and inequity would
be reduced. An alternative way to reduce subjective inequity is the introduction of
school uniforms. If school uniforms are introduced and (electronic) consumption goods
like mobile phones are not allowed at school, the importance of (parental) income as
a source of inequity at school (and in life) would be reduced. While these instruments
can reduce inequity and thereby the distortion in education choice, one needs always
to keep in mind, that these instruments can have effects on other things that we are
not dealing with here. They have, e.g., the price of a reduced level of freedom and
self-determination of students. But, if the aim is a reduced distortion in education
choice induced by inequity aversion, they seem to lead in the right direction.
As a last point we want to discuss the role of parents. In my model their income is
just an exogenous parameter, that influences individuals’ relative income in comparison
to their peers’ income in adolescence. In my model we normalized the share of parental
income that is spent on children to 1. But in general, parents should be able to at
least partly influence the share of their income they spend on their child. Therefore,
if the parents of a group of students can and want to equalize their parental spending
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on their children, they can reduce or even eliminate the distortion in their children’s
education choice induced by inequity aversion.
3.7 Conclusion
My model offers a new way to analyze individuals’ education choice. With the inte-
gration of inequity aversion into a simple education choice framework, we can explain
the empirically proven persistence of intergenerational income inequality and give new
insights into the functionality of peer effects. The education choice of inequity averse
individuals deviates systematically from the education choice of purely self-interested
individuals. Inequity averse students who are in adolescence relatively poor in compar-
ison to their peer group invest less time in education than students who are relatively
rich in comparison to their peers. The reason for relatively poor students to choose
less education are their higher opportunity costs of education. If they work in adoles-
cence, they can reduce the income gap in comparison to their peers and thereby reduce
their losses induced by inequity aversion. For inequity averse individuals it is also no
longer true that investment in education strictly increases with ability. For almost
all exogenous parameter values of my model, there are intervals of ability in which
investment in education decreases with ability. Having a rich peer group in working
life gives additional incentives to choose a high level of education, while having a poor
peer group in working life reduces the incentives to choose a high level of education. I
think that these new insights into an individual’s education choice should be reflected
in the analysis of education policy and the discussion of efficient education systems.
My approach is only one possible way to integrate inequity aversion into an ed-
ucation choice model. I see it as a starting point for future research. While in my
model the peer group’s income is exogenous, it would be more realistic for some spe-
cific questions to build a model with interactions between two or more students. We
described in section 3.5 of this chapter how such a model could look like. If a student
compares her grades or behavior with other students and is inequity averse, such a
model would explain the empirical finding that students’ academic attainment profits
from having good classmates and suffers from having bad classmates. Other empirical
results about the effects of streaming in school (Robertson and Symons 2003) could as
well be explained with such an approach.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
For several cases it has to be shown that the time investment in education e is not
increasing with ability θ:
a) For p > y
i) and y < (1− β)−1:
∃ θ̂ with (1+α)−1 < θ̂ < y. As by assumption y < (1−β)−1 ⇒ θ̂ < (1−β)−1. For p > y
we know that ∂U
∂h
< ∂U
∂l
= 1, ∀θ. As (1 + α)−1 < θ̂ < y ⇒ ∂U(bθ)
∂e
for e=0
= (1 + α)θ̂ > 1⇒
for θ̂: e > 0 in the optimum. But, ∃ θ˜ > θ̂ with y < θ˜ < (1 − β)−1 ⇒ ∂U(eθ)
∂e
for e=0
=
(1− β)θ˜ < 1⇒ for θ˜: e = 0 in the optimum.
ii) , y > (1− β)−1, and y
2
> 1
1+α
:
∃ θ̂ = y
2
with θ̂ < (1 − β)−1. As θ̂ = y
2
⇒ ∂U(bθ)
∂e
> 1, ∀e < 1 ⇒ e = 1 in the optimum.
But, ∃ θ˜ > θ̂ with θ˜ < (1 − β)−1 and θ˜(1 + e˜) = y with e˜ < 1 as θ˜ > y
2
. For ∀e > e˜
holds ∂U(
eθ)
∂e
= (1− β)θ˜ < 1⇒ for θ˜: e = e˜ < 1 in the optimum.
iii) , y > (1− β)−1, and y
2
< 1
1+α
:
∃ θ̂ with 1
1+α
< θ̂ < 1 < y ⇒ ∂U(bθ)
∂e
for e=0
= (1 + α)θ̂ > 1 and ∂U(
bθ)
∂e
for e=1
= (1− β)θ̂ < 1⇒
for the optimal ê : θ̂(1 + ê) = 1. But, ∃ θ˜ > θ̂ with θ˜ < 1 and optimal e˜ determined by
θ˜(1 + e˜) = 1. As θ˜ > θ̂ ⇒ e˜ < ê.
b) For y > p+ 1
i), y
2
< 1, and y < 1+α
1−β :
∃ θ̂ with 1 < θ̂ < y. For y > p + 1 we know that ∂U
∂l
< ∂U
∂h
= 1 + α, ∀θ. As
1 < θ̂ < y ⇒ ∂U(bθ)
∂e
for e=0
= (1+α)θ̂ > 1+α⇒ e > 0 in the optimum. But, for θ˜ = y > θ̂
holds ∂U(
eθ)
∂e
for e=0
= (1− β)θ˜ < 1 + α as θ˜ = y < 1+α
1−β ⇒ e = 0 in the optimum.
ii), y
2
< 1, and y > 1+α
1−β :
Choose 1 < θ̂ < θ˜ < 1+α
1−β . Then, similarly as in a) iii) the optimal ê and e˜ are
determined by (1 + ê)θ̂ = (1 + e˜)θ˜ = y ⇒ ê > e˜.
iii), y
2
> 1, and y < 2(1+α
1−β ):
∃ θ̂ with θ̂ = y
2
< 1+α
1−β . As θ̂ =
y
2
⇒ ∂U(bθ)
∂e
= (1 + α)θ̂ > 1 + α, ∀e < 1 ⇒ e = 1 in the
optimum. But, ∃ θ˜ > θ̂ with θ˜ < 1+α
1−β and θ˜(1+ e˜) = y with e˜ < 1 as θ˜ >
y
2
. For ∀e > e˜
holds ∂U(
eθ)
∂e
= (1− β)θ˜ < 1 + α⇒ for θ˜: e = e˜ < 1 in the optimum.
q.e.d.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2:
As the constraint l + h + e < 1 is always binding (see equation (3.4)) and both
∂U(θ)
∂l
and ∂U(θ)
∂e
are independent of whether (p > y) or (p < y), ∂U(θ)
∂h
as opportunity
costs of education are decisive for the difference in the time investment in education of
relatively rich in comparison to relatively poor individuals. As ∂U(θ)
∂h
for (p > y) ≤ ∂U(θ)
∂h
for (p < y), ∀θ ⇒ e(p > y) ≥ e(p < y), ∀θ.
Additionally, it is to show, that there is always a θ with e(p > y) > e(p < y). Two
cases have to be distinguished:
a) y < 2(1+α
1−β ):
For ∀θ > (1 − β)−1, p > y and e ∈ [0, 1] : ∂U(θ)
∂e
> 1 ⇒ e = 1 in the optimum.
For ∀p < y ∃ θ̂ with (1 − β)−1 < θ̂ < (1+α
1−β ) and θ̂ >
y
2
. As θ̂ > y
2
⇒ ∀e > ê with
(1 + ê)θ̂ = y : ∂U(
bθ)
∂e
= (1− β)θ̂ < (1 + α) = ∂U(bθ)
∂h
⇒ h > 0⇒ e < 1 in the optimum.
b) y > 2(1+α
1−β ):
As y > 2(1+α
1−β ) ⇒ y > 2 ⇒ i) For ∀θ with (1 + α)−1 < θ < 1, p > y and
e ∈ [0, 1] : ∂U(θ)
∂e
= (1 + α)θ > 1 = ∂U
∂l
> ∂U
∂h
⇒ e = 1 in the optimum. ii) For ∀p < y
and ∀θ with (1+α)−1 < θ < 1: ∂U(θ)
∂h
for h=0
= (1+α) > (1+α)θ = ∂U(θ)
∂e
⇒ h > 0⇒ e < 1
in the optimum.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
a) Increase of (average) investment in education with α for p > y:
For p > y and y > (1+α)−1: ∀θ < 1 with (1+α)−1 < θ < y ⇒ e > 0 with (1+ e)θ = y
if 2y < θ or e = 1 if 2y ≥ θ ⇔ e = min{y
θ
− 1, 1} ⇒ (if α increases ⇒ (1 + α)−1
decreases ⇒ the interval determining the θ’s that invest in education increases (for
θ < (1 + α)−1: e = 0). The optimal e stays the same for the other θ’s). For p > y and
y < (1 + α)−1 the investment in education is independent of α.
b) Decrease of (average) investment in education with β for p > y:
For p > y and y
2
< (1 − β)−1 : ∀θ > (1 − β)−1 ⇒ ∂U(θ)
∂e
> 1, ∀e ⇒ e = 1 in the
optimum. If β increases ⇒ (1 − β)−1 increases ⇒ less θ fully invest in education (for
y
2
< θ < (1 − β)−1: e < 1 as then ∂U(θ)
∂e
for e=1
< 1). For p > y and y
2
> (1 − β)−1 the
investment in education is independent of β.
c) Decrease of (average) investment in education with α for p+ 1 < y:
For p + 1 < y and y
2
< (1+α
1−β ) : ∀θ > (1+α1−β ) ⇒ e = 1 as ∂U(θ)∂e > (1 + α). ∀θ with
y
2
< θ < (1+α
1−β )⇒ e < 1 as ∂U(θ)∂e
for e=1
< (1 + α). If α increases ⇒ 1+α
1−β increases ⇒ less
θ fully invest in education. For y
2
> (1+α
1−β ) the investment in education is independent
of α.
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d) Decrease of (average) investment in education with β for p+ 1 < y:
Same proof as in c), only that (1+α
1−β ) in this case increases with β.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3.4:
We prove separated for a) p ∈ (y, y + a] and b) p ∈ [y − a, y − 1] (for a > 1) that
average investment in education e increases with y. If that is shown, it must also be
the case that for p ∈ [y − a, y] for a < 1 or p ∈ (y − 1, y] for a > 1 average investment
in education e increases with y, as the incentives known from the first two cases just
overlap in the third case.
a) For p ∈ (y, y + a] and
i) y < (1 + α)−1: e = 0 for θ < (1 − β)−1 and e = 1 for θ ≥ (1 − β)−1. Average
investment in education (over all θ < 1+α
1−β ; e is independent of y for θ ≥ 1+α1−β ): e = α1+α .
ii) y
2
< (1 + α)−1 ≤ y < (1 − β)−1: e = 0 for θ < (1 + α)−1, e = y
θ
− 1 for
(1 + α)−1 ≤ θ < y, e = 0 for y ≤ θ < (1 − β)−1, and e = 1 for (1 − β)−1 ≤ θ.
Average investment in education (over all θ < 1+α
1−β ): e =
(1−β) R y
(1+α)−1 (
y
θ
−1)dθ
1+α
+ α
1+α
=
(1−β)(y(ln y−1−ln(1+α)−1)+(1+α)−1)
1+α
+ α
1+α
with ∂e
∂y
= 1−β
1+α
(ln y − ln(1 + α)−1) > 0 as
y > (1 + α)−1.
iii.1) y
2
< (1+α)−1 < (1−β)−1 ≤ y: e = 0 for θ < (1+α)−1, , e = y
θ
−1 for (1+α)−1 ≤
θ < (1−β)−1, and e = 1 for (1−β)−1 ≤ θ. Average investment in education (over all θ <
1+α
1−β ): e =
(1−β) R (1−β)−1
(1+α)−1 (
y
θ
−1)dθ
1+α
+ α
1+α
= (1−β)(y(ln(1−β)
−1−ln(1+α)−1)−(1−β)−1+(1+α)−1)
1+α
+ α
1+α
with ∂e
∂y
= 1−β
1+α
(ln(1− β)−1 − ln(1 + α)−1) > 0.
iii.2) (1+α)−1 ≤ y
2
< y < (1−β)−1: e = 0 for θ < (1+α)−1, e = 1 for (1+α)−1 ≤ θ < y
2
,
e = y
θ
−1 for y
2
≤ θ < y, e = 0 for y ≤ θ < (1−β)−1, and e = 1 for (1−β)−1 ≤ θ. Aver-
age investment in education (over all θ < 1+α
1−β ): e =
(1−β)(y/2−(1+α)−1)
1+α
+
(1−β) R y
y/2
( y
θ
−1)dθ
1+α
+
α
1+α
= (1−β)(y/2−(1+α)
−1)
1+α
+ (1−β)(y(ln y−ln(y/2))−y/2)
1+α
+ α
1+α
with ∂e
∂y
= 1−β
1+α
(ln y−ln(y/2)) > 0.
iv) (1 + α)−1 ≤ y
2
< (1 − β)−1 ≤ y: e = 0 for θ < (1 + α)−1, e = 1 for
(1 + α)−1 ≤ θ < y
2
, e = y
θ
− 1 for y
2
≤ θ < (1 − β)−1, and e = 1 for θ ≥ (1 − β)−1.
Average investment in education (over all θ < 1+α
1−β ): e =
(1−β)(y/2−(1+α)−1)
1+α
+
(1−β) R (1−β)−1
y/2
( y
θ
−1)dθ
1+α
+ α
1+α
= (1−β)(y/2−(1+α)
−1)
1+α
+ (1−β)(y(ln(1−β)
−1−ln(y/2)−1/2)−(1−β)−1)
1+α
+ α
1+α
with ∂e
∂y
= 1−β
1+α
(ln(1− β)−1 − ln(y/2)) > 0.
v) (1 − β)−1 ≤ y
2
: e = 0 for θ < (1 + α)−1 and e = 1 for θ ≥ (1 + α)−1. Average
investment in education (over all θ < 1+α
1−β ): e = 1− 1−β(1+α)2 .
It is easy show that e is a continuous function of y. Together with i)-v) it is then
proved that e increases in y for p ∈ (y, y + a].
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b) For p ∈ [y − a, y − 1] (for a > 1) and
i) y
2
< 1 ≤ y < 1+α
1−β : e = 0 for θ < 1, e =
y
θ
− 1 for 1 ≤ θ < y, and e = 0 for
y ≤ θ < 1+α
1−β . Average investment in education (over all θ <
1+α
1−β ; e is independent of
y for θ ≥ 1+α
1−β ): e =
(1−β) R y1 ( yθ−1)dθ
1+α
= (1−β)(y(ln y−1)+1)
1+α
with ∂e
∂y
= (1−β) ln y
1+α
≥ 0.
ii.1) y
2
< 1 < 1+α
1−β ≤ y: e = 0 for θ < 1 and e = yθ − 1 for 1 ≤ θ < 1+α1−β . Average
investment in education (over all θ < 1+α
1−β ): e =
(1−β) R
1+α
1−β
1 (
y
θ
−1)dθ
1+α
=
(1−β)(y ln 1+α
1−β− 1+α1−β+1)
1+α
with ∂e
∂y
=
(1−β) ln 1+α
1−β
1+α
> 0.
ii.2) 1 ≤ y
2
< y < 1+α
1−β : e = 0 for θ < 1, e = 1 for 1 ≤ θ < y2 , e = yθ − 1 for
y
2
≤ θ < y, and e = 0 for y ≤ θ < 1+α
1−β . Average investment in education (over all
θ < 1+α
1−β ): e =
(1−β)(y/2−1)
1+α
+
(1−β) R y
y/2
( y
θ
−1)dθ
1+α
= (1−β)(y/2−1)
1+α
+ (1−β)(y(ln y−ln(y/2))−y/2)
1+α
with
∂e
∂y
= 1−β
1+α
(ln y − ln(y/2)) > 0.
iii) 1 ≤ y
2
< 1+α
1−β ≤ y: e = 0 for θ < 1, e = 1 for 1 ≤ θ < y2 , and
e = y
θ
− 1 for y
2
≤ θ < 1+α
1−β . Average investment in education (over all θ <
1+α
1−β ):
e = (1−β)(y/2−1)
1+α
+
(1−β) R
1+α
1−β
y/2
( y
θ
−1)dθ
1+α
= (1−β)(y/2−1)
1+α
+
(1−β)(y(ln 1+α
1−β−ln(y/2))− 1+α1−β+y/2)
1+α
with
∂e
∂y
= 1−β
1+α
(ln 1+α
1−β − ln(y/2) + y − 1) > 0.
iv) 1+α
1−β ≤ y2 : e = 0 for θ < 1 and e = 1 for 1 ≤ θ < 1+α1−β . Average investment in
education (over all θ < 1+α
1−β ): e =
α+β
(1+α)
.
It is easy show that e is a continuous function of y. Together with i)-iv) it is then
proved that e increases in y for p ∈ [y − a, y − 1] (for a > 1).
q.e.d.
3.8.2 Figures
The following figures illustrate the outcome of the education choice, if peer income y’s
relative size in comparison to the inequity aversion parameters α and β is different from
figure 3.1. We hold α and β constant and start with an extremely small peer income.
Afterward we proceed with rising peer incomes. Figure 3.1 depicts a case in which
y has a medium size and would be located between figures 3.4 and 3.5. As already
mentioned the relative size of the peer’s income in comparison to the parameters of
inequity aversion is decisive, not their absolute values. Thus, the six figures represent
(qualitatively) the vast majority of potential cases. But, there are still cases, in which
outcomes look different. These are the cases in which both the 2θ = y- and θ = y-lines
lie in one of the five intervals of θ mentioned in section 3.2. But these are the less
interesting cases and do not give new insights into the nature of the problem.
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Figure 3.2: Education choice with an extremely low peer income y
Figure 3.3: Education choice with a very low peer income y
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Figure 3.4: Education choice with a low peer income y
Figure 3.5: Education choice with a very large peer income y
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Figure 3.6: Education choice with an extremely large peer income y
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